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PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM USE
IN PORNOGRAPHY: TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ENFORCEABLE LEGISLATION
Within the past two years there has been a growing awareness of
the shocking use and display of young children in pornographic
materials. 1 While nearly every person in this country is, in a general sense, outraged by this abuse of children, the legislative answers to the problem have caused considerable debate. Indeed,
serious constitutional issues are raised in attempting to end the
abuse of children, while protecting the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first amendment. 2 Yet, due to the outrageous nature of
some child pornography ,3 the constitutional issues are often ignored .4 It is, however, in precisely these areas of strong emotions
that constitutional freedoms must be carefully considered.
This article will begin with an overview of the child pornography
problem, then move to a more detailed discussion of the harms
wrought upon children and society by the production and distribution of such material. A discussion of prior law will follow, detailing the need for legislation aimed specifically at the child pornography
industry. The majority of the article will undertake a critical
examination of existing child pornography legislation. The various
elements of the offenses will be discussed and recommendations
will be made to assure the effectiveness and constitutionality of
child pornography statutes. In addition, provisions designed to
facilitate easier enforcement of the statutes will be considered.
Provisions seeking to protect and rehabilitate the victimized child
will also be considered. Finally, recommendations made through-

'See "60 Minutes," C.B.S. telecast, May 15, 1977, vol. IX, no. 33: "Kiddie Porn" [hereinafter cited as "Kiddie Porn"], reprinted in Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Juvenile Delinquency Hearings]; Child Pornography: Outrage Starts to Stir Some Action,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 13, 1977, at 66; Child's Garden of Perversity, TIME,
April 4, 1977, at 55; J. Densen-Gert,er, What Pornographers Are Doing to Children: A
Shocking Report, REDHOOK, August 1977, at 30; Moseley, Investigation of Child Pornography, Chicago Tribune (four part series of articles), May 15, 1977, at 1, col. I, May 16, 1977,
at 1, col. 1, May 17, 1977, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
428-42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Crime Hearings].
2
For a discussion of first amendment problems, see notes 76-147 and accompanying text
infra.
3
"Child pornography" can be defined, in a broad sense, as any print or visual material
that depicts a child engaged in explicit sexual conduct. However, for purposes oflegislation,
"child pornography" must be more carefully defined. Indeed, arriving at precise meanings
of" visual material,''' 'child,'' and "explicit sexual conduct'' are the major problems faced
by legislators. These various elements of the definition will be discussed in detail. See notes
76-170 and accompanying text infra.
• This is particularly true in the popular literature. See, e.g., "Kiddie Porn," supra note l;
Moseley, supra note I, reprinted in House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 428-42.
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out this analysis will be summarized for the benefit of legislators
and others seeking to improve the effectiveness of child pornography laws.
I.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Although the use of children in pornography has become widely
publicized only in the past several years, the phenomenon is not of
recent origin. 5 It is equally clear, however, that the demand for
child pornography has increased substantially in the past several
years. 6 Today over 260 magazines are available in the United
States which depict children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 7
In addition, hundreds of short films ("loops") involving children
are produced and sold each year. 8 Other available forms of child
pornography include still photographs, playing cards,9 and video
cassettes . 1 0
These materials depict children, as young as three years old, 11
engaged in all types of sexual activity, including intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, rape, incest, sexual sadomasochism, and lewd poses. The children are depicted with other children
and adults of both sexes. 12

• Senate Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (testimony of Ronald Kelly,
Sergeant, Chicago Police Department).
• The burgeoning of child pornography is thought to be the latest (perhaps final) step in the
pornography industry. As one writer put it:

Porn is an industry, a service industry you might call it, and, like any other industry, it has to constantly create a demand for new products, or else the market becomes stagnant. And, the fact is, until kiddie porn came along, the porn business
was in trouble. Everything had been tried. People were bored .... So the great
search commenced .... [Finally] the industry found The Answer, "the last frontier,"as one "straight" porn producer puts it, the ultimate tum-on: kids.
Anson, The Last Porno Show, NEW TIMES, June 24, 1977, reprinted in Senate Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, supra note 1, at 150-51.
1 R. LLOYD, FOR MONEY OR LOVE: BOY PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA 226 (1976).
8
A loop is a 10 to 12 minute film, retailing for $25 to $50. Senate Juvenile Delinquency
Hearings, supra note I, at 24 (testimony of Guy Strait, convicted child molester). Examples
of the subject matter of such films include one film depicting an alleged father engaged in
uralalia with his four year old daughter and another film depicting children violently deflowered on their communion day. House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of
Judianne Densen-Gerber, President, Odyssey Institute).
• House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 41 (statement regarding playing cards which picture naked, spread-eagled children).
1 0 S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CooE CONG. &
Ao. NEWS 40, 43.
11 For example, the magazine entitled "Moppets'' features photographs of girls aged 3 to
12. House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 41.
12 See generally Comment, Preying on Playgrounds: The Sexp/oitation of Children in
Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 809, 810-20 (1978); Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Education and Labor Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Select
Education Hearings], House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 41; Senate Juvenile De/in-
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Since the production of pornographic material is clandestine, it is
extremely difficult to accurately estimate the number of children
involved in the production of child pornography. Estimates range
from 30,000 children directly involved in child pornography, 13 to
nearly one million if all forms of sexual and commercial exploitation of children are considered. 14
Although it is difficult to generalize about the type of children
involved in the industry, the majority of the victims are thought to
be runaways or from broken homes. 15 Many of the victims, especially the runaways, are lonely and without money, often with
nothing to sell except their bodies. 16 Frequently the producer
serves as a parent model for the child, sometimes gaining the child's
trust before engaging in ~exual exploitation. 1 7 Other children view
posing for pictures and the closely related prostitution activities 18
as an easy way to make money. 19
The production of child pornography is a nationwide phenomenon with the major production centers in the large urban areas. 20
quency, Hearings, supra note I, at 67. Obscenity laws are aimed at the harm to society from
exposure to sexually explicit material. On the other hand, child pornography regulations
should seek to protect the child actors from abuse. For further discussion, see notes 30-37
and accompanying text infra.
13 Wondering If Children Are Necessary, TtME, March 5, 1979, at 42.
14
House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 45 (testimony of Judianne Densen-Gerber,
President, Odyssey Institute).
15 For a good description of the sexually exploited child, see Comment, supra note 12,
at 817-20.
16
"[T]he young victims we are concerned with are usually runaways, reasonably 'streetwise,' emotionally troubled children who trade themselves for money or for what they interpret as affection." House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 57(statement of Lloyd H. Martin,
Los Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit).
17
Although of questionable credibility, Mr. Guy Strait, a convicted child molester and
child pornography producer, testified that all his victims volunteered to be photographed.
House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 64; Senate Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, supra
note 1, at 28. The emotional connection between the child victim and the adult producer is
evidenced in part by the difficulty of getting the victim to testify against the abuser. Id. at 16
(testimony of Sergeant Ronald Kelly, Chicago Police Department). See also House Crime
Hearings, supra note I, at 64 (testimony of Lloyd H. Martin, Los Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit).
18
There is a connection between child pornography and child prostitution. For example,
one producer ran a home for wayward boys where he encouraged young boys to engage in
orgies that he filmed with a hidden camera. He then sold the films to "sponsors" of the
home and also arranged for some of the sponsors to come out to the farm to have sex with
the boys. S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 32, 37.
19 For an excellent first hand account of this phenomenon, see the testimony of Marty, a
17 year old prostitute and child pornography actor. Senate Juvenile Delinquency Hearings,
supra note I, at 18-22. For an outrageous account of the work of an 8 year old hustler, see
House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 61.
These children who are consenting partners in the sexual activity "may appear to be
'hustlers,' but they are in fact children and victims in the truest sense of the word.'' Id. at 57
(statement of Lloyd H. Martin, Los Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child
Unit).
20
Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago are reported to be the largest production centers.
S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 40, 43.
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Since production requires nothing more than a hotel room, movie
camera, and one or more child actors, however, producers have
been discovered throughout the United States. 21
The child pornography business can best be understood as a
two-tiered industry composed of producers and distributors. The
producer group is most directly engaged in the use of children for
commercial purposes. This group includes those persons who
coerce or entice children into appearing in the visual material.
These same persons are generally those who photograph the children. 22 In some cases, however, individuals may only be involved
in obtaining the children for the use of those who engage in and record the events of sexual behavior. 23 In the most extreme cases,
children are coerced into posing by their own parents. 24
The distributor group includes sellers of films, magazines,
books, and other materials, as well as operators of bookstores and
theaters that exhibit these films and pictures. Although this group
is not directly engaged in the abuse of children, 25 it provides the
producer group with incentives for the continued production of
child pornography. 26 Large profit margins, coupled with the
enormous demand for material, create a tremendous economic incentive to produce and distribute child pomography. 27
21
For example, producers have been found in such unlikely places as Port Huron, Michigan and Winchester, Tennessee. Id.
22
House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 112 (testimony of Michael Sneed, Chicago
Tribune). Contrary to popular belief, these abusers are not all "dirty old men." Rather, they
are often "wealthy, mobile, educated, sometimes very important members ofa community." These people often infiltrate organizations and groups which deal with children. House
Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 93 (testimony of Robert F. Leonard, National Association
of District Attorneys). Suggestions have been made to improve the employment screening
process of those who work for these groups. Id. at 93-95. Such proposals are beyond the
scope of this article.
23
lnvestigations have uncovered nationwide schemes for the dissemination of information
regarding children available for the purposes of sexual exploitation. One publication, The
Broad Street Journal, is in essence an ad listing agency for pedophiles. In 1972, a pamphlet
was published, entitled "Where the Young Ones Are," which listed 378 places in 59 cities of
34 states where "the young can be found." House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 58, 62.
24
"There are several documented cases where prostitutes sold their own children for sexual purposes." S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 40, 46.
25
Arguably, the distributors of child pornography aid and abet the producer's child abuse.
This argument will be fully developed below. See notes 141-43 and accompanying text infra.
In some instances, the same person produces and sells the material. For purposes of the
proceeding analysis, the producer and distributor groups will be considered separately.
26
One producer-distributor estimated he made $5-7 million in his own operation, before
he was convicted of child molestation. House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 117. Magazines that retail for $7.50 to $12.50 per copy can be produced for 35 to 50 cents. Id. at 59. A
200-foot film that retails for $100 can be produced for $21 per copy. S. REP. No. 438, 95th
Cong., IstSess. 6(1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE. CONG. & Ao. NEWS40, 44. See also
Senate Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, supra note I, at 39 (two hundred foot film retails for
$75-$200 depending on the "action"; twelve photos retail for $10).
27 Because of the large amount of money involved, many suspect that organized crime is,
or will become, heavily involved in the child pornography industry. The extent of organized
crime's involvement in the child pornography industry is unknown. There are some reports
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In first considering the child pornography problem, the natural
tendency is to concentrate on the traditional hard core smut producers. It is important to note, however, that the display of children
involved in certain explicit sexual activities is not limited to material most people would consider pornography. 28 Therefore, since
the prohibition on the use of children in visual material is premised
on the prevention of harm to the child, a complete discussion cannot exclude consideration of non-obscene material. The regulation
of child pornography is better thought of as addressing a child
abuse problem rather than an obscenity problem.
II. HARM

TO CHILDREN AND SOCIETY

While there is a general sense of outrage regarding the use of
children in pornography, to develop effective solutions to the problem, it is necessary to reduce this general outrage to concrete
harms. Only then can an intelligent decision be reached as to what
conduct should be regulated or prohibited.
A. Harm in Production of Material

Perhaps the greatest harms are the emotional and psychological
damage to the child who is forced to engage in various sexual acts
at a young age. As a result of such early sexual encounters, it is
often difficult for a child to develop healthy affectionate relationships in the future. 29 Evidence shows that sexually abused children
tend to have sexual dysfunctions later in life, including promiscuity
and frigidity .3 ° Furthermore, children who have been sexually
abused tend to become sexual abusers as adults. 31 Hence, the
that, to the extent that such rumors are true, the syndicate is primarily tied to the distribution end of the industry. See generally House Crime Hearings, supra note l, at 47, 70, 96,
Jll, 308.
28
Some of this material is certainly not legally obscene. For example, the popular movie
The Exorcist depicts a child simulating masturbation with a crucifix. Although some viewers
may have found that particular scene offensive, The Exorcist was clearly not a product of the
pornography industry. See notes l05-106 and accompanying text infra.
29
S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 40, 46. Evidence suggests that many of these children will become deeply involved in drugs, prostitution, and other criminal activity in their adult lives. House Crime
Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of Lloyd H. Martin, Los Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit). See Panel Workshop: Violence, Crime Sexual Abuse
and Addiction, 5 CoNTEMP. DRuG PRoe. 385 (1976).
30
House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 73 (testimony of Rep. Dale E. Kildee).
31
J. Densen-Gerber, S. Hutchinson, & R. Levine, Incest and Drug-Related Child
Abuse-Systematic Neglect by the Medical and Legal Professions, 6 CONTEMP. DRUG
PRoe. 135, 137 (1977). See also House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of
Lloyd H. Martin, Los Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit); S. REP.
No. 438, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
40, 46.
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psychological and emotional harm often extends throughout the
life of the child. 32 It must be recognized, however, that the magnitude of the emotional harm varies with the age of the child and
the frequency and severity of the sexual abuse. 33
Although most of the child victims of pornography production
are only affected emotionally, physical harm can also result. There
is substantial evidence that production of child pornography and
the sexual molestation of children are closely related. 34 Most of
this harm results from sexual molestation from adults, whether it is
recorded on film or not. 35 Even if the child is photographed alone
or with other children in simulated acts, the producers of the visual
material often engage in sexual activity with the child before and
after photographing. 36 Thus, the absence of adults in the visual
material does not mean that the child has not been sexually assaulted by an adult.
B. Harm From Produced Material

Although the connection between obscene material in general
and sex crimes has been hotly debated, 37 child pornography ap32
S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEWS 40, 46.
33
The interrelationship between age and nature of sexual abuse has been explained by one
psychiatrist as follows:

"[l]f a child gets through the first six years of psycho-sexual development in a healthy state, then a single seduction or molestation, whether heterosexual or
homosexual in nature, will not alter his sexual role. However, a child with a flimsy
sexual identification at age seven or eight may suffer permanent development damage and a reversal of his heterosexual identification by an environmental trauma of
contact with a pedophiliac of either sex. The doctor concluded that such encounters are more likely to tip the balance for a seven or eight year-old than for a fifteen
year-old who may have more fully acted out or solidified his sexuality."

Id. at 76 (statement of Robert F. Leonard, National Association of District Attorneys).
34
See House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 58-59 (statement of Lloyd H. Martin, Los
Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit).
35 Children are most crten physically harmed when forced to engage in sadomasochistic
abuse. In the most extreme case, the child victim is murdered in the course of the sexual
abuse. For specific details, see Anson, The Last Porno Show, NEW TIMES, June 24, 1977,
reprinted in Senate Juvenile Delinquency Hearings, supra note I, at 154. In addition, a more
subtle form of physical harm has also been reported. "The prepubescent child having intercourse does not have a vaginal pH which protects against infection. Work in Australia by
Dr. Malcom Doppileson, a gynecologist and Odyssey Board Member, has shown that children who have prepubescent intercourse have the highest incidence of cervical carcinoma of
all women at early ages in their twenties and thirties." House Crime Hearings, supra note I,
at 44 (testimony of Judianne Densen-Getber, President, Odyssey Institute).
36 House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Lloyd H. Martin, Los
Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit); id. at 114 (testimony of Michael
Sneed, Chicago Tribune) (describing an actual case in which pornographic materials were
used in molesting a five year-old girl).
37
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PoRNOGRAPHY (1970); HILLLINK MINORITY REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970)
[hereinafter cited HILL-LINK]; REPORT OF CHARLES H. KEATING, JR., COMMISSION ON
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970) [hereinafter cited as KEATING]. See also note 41 in-
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pears to play a special role in the sexual molestation of children. 38
Pornography, particularly photos of children engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, is frequently used to sexually stimulate both the
molester and the child, as well as to overcome inhibitions a child
may have regarding the acts that he or she is expected to commit. 39
In addition to the direct connection between child pornography
and child molestation, the presence of child pornography may be
harmful to society in a general sense. 40 Although studies have not
been undertaken regarding the effect on society of pornographic
material depicting children, arguments have been advanced that
such material will lead to a further decay in family values and fundamental moral principles. 41
In addition to this possible societal harm, publication of the visual material arguably imposes a harm on the child victim analogous
to the emotional harm redressed in the invasion of privacy tort. 42
Public exposure of the child's body and sexual activity may cause
emotional damage beyond that incurred in the actual photographing of the child. The victim's knowledge of publication of the visual
material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the
child. 43
In summary, the harms of child pornography are arguably found
in the production and distribution of the material. The harm to the
child in the production of such material is virtually undisputed.
While the harm to society inherent exposure to such material is
open to some question, publication of the visual material arguably
furthers the psychological harm suffered by the child.
\

38
Recent investigations by the Sexually Exploited Child Unit in Los Angeles showed that
in the more than 50 cases of child molestation investigated in an eight month period, pornography was involved in every case. House Crime Hearings, supra note I, at 58 (statement of
Lloyd H. Martin, Los Angeles Police Department, Sexually Exploited Child Unit).
39
Id. at 112 (testimony of Michael Sneed, Chicago Tribune) ("In interviews with young
boys who have [been picked up by chickenhawks] they say that 9 times out of 10, pictures
are actually taken of them. Pornographic films are shown to them. It is a way of getting them
around to it."); id. at 307 (statement of Robert G. Gemignani, First Assistant State's Attorney, Rockford, Ill.).
40
Such an argument was advanced by Dr. Judianne Densen-Gerber. Id. at 41.
41
Many commentators have made this argument in regard to standard obscene material.
See, e.g., Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
391, 394-95 (1963); HILL-LINK, supra note 37; KEATING, s.upra note 37. However, it is generally accepted that the adverse effects of obscene materials in general have never been conclusively proved or disproved. Nevertheless, the questionable nature of the harm resulting
from exposure to obscene materials does not preclude the State from legislating in these
areas. Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-64 (1973). This article does not undertake an analysis of whether the state should regulate sexually explicit materials as a general
matter.
42
See note 123 and accompanying text infra.
43
Telephone interview with Dr. Ann Thompson, M.D., consulting child psychiatrist to
the University of Michigan Interdisciplinary Project on Child Abuse and Neglect, April
16, 1979.
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INADEQUACY OF PRIOR LEGISLATION

Given the identifiable harms stemming from the widespread use
of children in visual materials, legislation is needed to prevent the
use of children in pornography. To understand what legislation is
required to prevent these harms, it is necessary to first consider the
extent to which existing legislation covers this area.
All states have sex offense statutes which prohibit various sexual
acts, including rape, incest, and indecent or immoral conduct with
minors. 44 These laws appear to reach the producers of child pornography. These laws, however, would be applicable only in cases
where the adult actually sexually molested the child, and not where
the child was forced to pose alone or with other children. 45 In addition, evidence of molestation is often difficult to obtain. 46
Child abuse laws also appear to reach the producers of child pornography. Application of these laws, which make criminal 47 the
physical abuse of children, to the child pornography problem is limited, however, in several respects. First, many of the laws only impose liability on parents and guardians. 48 Second, some of the laws
have relatively weak penalty provisions .49 Third, many of the laws
only outlaw physical abuse. 50 Many of the victims of child pornog44
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 130.00-.70 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978) (rape,
sodomy, and sexual abuse); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 255.25 (McKinney 1975) (incest).
45
The sex offenses only prohibit actual sexual contact by an adult with a child. Thus,
children posing with other children or nudity is not proscribed by these statutes.
46
These evidentiary problems arise in two respects. First, there is a problem ·of witness
competency in cases where the victim is too young. Second, even if the witness is legally
competent, he or she is often too frightened or confused to properly testify. House Crime
Hearings, supra note 1, at 306 (statement of Robert G. Gemignani, First Assistant State's
Attorney, Rockford, Ill.); id. at 198 (testimony of Rep. Barbara A. Mikulski).
47
The criminal statutes outlawing child abuse and neglect are only one class of laws which
deal with the child abuse problem. One commentator has identified three other groups of
child abuse legislation. These include "juvenile or family court acts that permit such courts
to assume protective custody or supervision over 'neglected' children ... ; legislation that
establishes protective services for abused and neglected children as part of a comprehensive
program of public child welfare services; [and] reporting statutes that encourage or mandate
the reporting of actual or suspected abuse or neglect for the child's protection and the family's treatment." Katz, Ambrosino, McGarth, & Sawitsky, Legal Research on Child Abuse
and Neglect: Past and Future, 11 FAM. L. Q. 151, 154 (1977). These three categories deal exclusively with abuse by parents and guardians. On the other hand, some of the criminal statutes impose liability on all abusers. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 273d (West 1970 &
Supp. 1978) (" ... any person who wilfully inflicts upon any child any cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition is guilty of a felony .... ").
48
See, e.g., N. Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1012(e) (McKinney Supp. 1978), which defines
"abused child" as "a child less than eighteen years of age whose parent or other person
legally responsible for his care [abuses such child]."
49
In those states that impose criminal liability on abusing adults, the crime is generally a
misdemeanor. Generally, the penalty for a misdemeanor is a relatively small fine and a
prison term of less than one year. For a more detailed analysis see Katz, Howe, & McGrath,
Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L. Q. 1, 75-362. The penalties under the child pornography laws are substantially longer. See notes 221-27 and accompanying text infra.
5
° For a review of the various definitions of "neglect and abuse" of a child, see Katz,
Howe, & McGarth, supra note 49, at 75-362.
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raphy production are harmed psychologically, rather than physically.
Laws which outlaw acts contributing to the delinquency of a
minor may also be applied to those engaged in abusive activity during the production process. 51 Like the child abuse statutes, these
laws have weak penalty provisions. 52
The existing obscenity laws prohibit the dissemination and the
production of any material found to be legally obscene. If most
child pornography is obscene under existing standards, 53 there is
arguably no need for further legislation. 54 Application of the present obscenity laws would effectively proscribe the use of children
in legally obscene materials. These laws, however, would provide
no relief for those children who are similarly photographed and
sexually abused, but whose pictures appear in nonobscene
works. 55 This shortcoming is further compounded by the difficulty
of prosecution under the current obscenity laws, 56 and the low
priority status of obscenity prosecutions in general. 57 Relying on
the current obscenity laws to prevent the sexual abuse of children
in visual material would rest on a determination of "obscenity,"
without regard to the concomitant harm to the child. While such a
determination might be relevant when applied to distributors,
where strong freedom of speech interests are involved, 58 it does
not apply to the producer's direct abuse of the child where no
countervailing constitutional issues must be considered.
In summary, although several categories of existing laws are
readily applicable to certain producer and distributor activities as51 See, e.g., N. Y. PENAL LAW§§ 260.10-.20 (McKinney 1975) (endangering the welfare
of a child and unlawfully dealing with a child).
52
The penalty for contributing to a minor's delinquency is generally a misdemeanor. See,
e.g., N. Y. PENAL LAW§ 260.20 (McKinney 1975)(class B misdemeanor).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule 1724, 460 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N .Y. 1978);
United States v. Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Va. 1971) (all supporting convictions under
regular obscenity laws for materials depicting children).
54
See House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 245-49 (testimony of Larry E. Parrish,
former Assistant United States Attorney, Memphis, Tenn.).
55 It makes no sense to deny protection to a child who is sexually abused for the purposes
of making visual material, simply because the finished product is nonobscene. Simply
stated, there is no connection between the legal status of the material and the harm to the
child. See notes 76-161 a11d accompanying text infra.
56
For an excellent statement of the difficulties of prosecution under the obscenity laws,
from the point of view of a former Assistant United States Attorney, see House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 241-53.
57
Id. at 48 (testimony of Judianne Densen-Geroer, President, Odyssey Institute); id. at 98
(testimony of Robert Leonard, President-Elect, National Association of District Attorneys).
A related problem is the difficulty in getting tough sentences from judges who are
philosophically opposed to the obscenity laws. For example, after pleading guilty to obscenity felonies involving children, one man was given 27 consecutive weekends in jail instead of
the possible 7 year sentence. Id. at 48.
58
See notes 101-34 and accompanying text infra.
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sociated with child pornography, these laws are limited in effect
because of proof problems, their failure to reach all abusive acts,
and their weak sanctions. Consequently, further legislation is
needed to comprehensively combat the problems inherent in child
pornography. 59
IV.

LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES

The recent publicity surrounding child pornography has prompted legislation designed to combat the problem. As of this writing,
thirty-nine states have passed laws aimed at the child pornography
problem, thirty-four states having enacted legislation in 1977 or
1978. 60 In addition, a recently enacted federal law became-effective in February, 1978. 61
Due to the identity of substantive issues, the federal and state
laws will be considered together. The federal law only regulates interstate aspects of the child pornography problem. 62 It is important
59
In addition to filling the gaps, new legislation may also create an impetus for stronger
enforcement of existing law, especially if the existing law is recodified in the pornography
context.
60 As of April 20, 1979, 34 states have passed statutes specifically designed to deal with the
child pornography problem. ALA. CooE tit. 13, §§ 7-230 to 238 (Supp. 1978); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.455 (Supp. 1978)(effective January I, 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3508, 3551 to 3555 (West Pamph. Supp. 1978); CAL LAB. CooE §§ 1309.5-.6 (West Supp. 1979);
CAL PENAL CooE §§ 311.2(b), .4 (West Supp. 1979); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 53a-196a
to 196b (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1103, 1108-1110 (Supp. 1978); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 847.014 (Harrison Supp. 1978); GA. CooE ANN. § 54-309.l(b) (Harrison
Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 707-750 to 751 (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
11-20 a (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); IND. CooE §§ 35-30-10.1-1 to -4, -42-4-4 (Burns
Supp. 1978); Act of June 5, 1978, Sen. File 2205, 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 224 (to be codified as
IowA CooE §§ 728-728.1); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3516 (Supp. 1978); Kv. REv. STAT.
§§ 531.300-.370 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:81.1 (West Supp. 1978); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2921-2923, tit. 30, § 508 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27,
§ 419A (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 272, §§ 29A, 30D, 31 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145c (Supp. 1978), and Act of June 14, 1978,
Pub. Act No. 228, 1978 Mich. Legis. Serv. 701 (West)(to be codified as MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 409.114a, .122); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 568.060 (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-1463 to 1464 (Supp. 1978);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 169:32, 650:1-:2 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 2A:142:A-I to
5 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-6-1 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 263.00.25 (McKinney Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CooE ANN. §§ 2907.32.1, 2919.22 (Page Supp.
1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1021.1-.3 (West Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 6312 (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 11-9-1 to I.I (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED
LAws ANN.§§ 22-22-22 to -25 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CooE ANN.§§ 39-1019, 50-707(t) (Supp.
1978); Tux. PENAL CooE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 43.23, .25 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1978); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.203 (West Supp. 1979). In addition, five states have criminal statutes that prohibit employment of a child in connection with a violation of the state obscenity laws. N .C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-190.6 (Supp. 1977); N .D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-27.1-03 (1976)(applies only to
live performances); S.C. CooE § 16-15-180 (1976); VA. CODE § 18.2-379 (1975); W. VA.
CODE § 61-8A-6 (1977).
61
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 22512253, 2423 (West Supp. 1978).
62
For a preliminary discussion of the interstate commerce issue, which is not discussed in
this article, see House Select Education Hearings, supra note 12, at 296-98.
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for state lawmakers to recognize that the federal law does not preempt state legislation. Rather, the legislative history indicates the
federal law was enacted as part of a coordinated state and federal
approach to the child pornography problem. 63 Thus, federal legislation cannot adequately regulate child pornography absent
supplementary legislation at the state level.
A. General Approach of the Laws

In varying combinations, these new laws impose criminal liability on all the participants in the child pornography industry. The
federal law and thirty-nine state laws impose criminal liability on
the producer of the visual material depicting children in sexually
explicit conduct. 64 The federal law and twenty-nine states make
criminal the coercing or enticing of a child to be photographed in
child pornography. 65 In addition, the federal law and eleven states
63 H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977) ("We perceived a need to not supplant
or discourage state and local response to those practices, but to respond in the areas where
the states turned to the federal government for assistance."); S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong.,
!st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 40, 48. ("What is
needed is a coordinated effort by Federal, state and local law enforcement officials aimed at
eradicating this form of child abuse.").
64 18 U.S.C.A. § 225l(a) (Supp. 1978); ALA. CoDE tit. 13, § 7-237 (Supp. 1978); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.41.455 (Supp. 1978) (effective January I, 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 133508, -3552 (West Pamph. Supp. 1978); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 311.4 (West Supp. 1979); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196a (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § ll08 (Supp.
1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.014(2)(a) (Harrison Supp. 1978); GA. CoDE ANN. § 54309.l(b) (Harrison Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 707-750 (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § ll-20a(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); IND. CODE§§ 35-30-10.1-3, -42-4-4
(Supp. 1978); Act of June 5, 1978, Sen. File 2205, § I, 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 224 (to be
codified as low A CODE§ 728); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3516 (Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 531.310 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:81.1 (West Supp. 19.78); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2922 (West Supp. 1978); MD, ANN. Co DE art. 27, § 419A (Supp. 1978); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.145c(2) (Supp. 1978), and Act of June 14, 1978, Pub. Act No. 228, § I, 1978 Mich.
Legis. Serv. 701 (West) (to be codified as M1cH. CoMP. LAWS§§ 409.114a, .122); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.060 (Vernon Pamph.
Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28-1463(1) (Supp. 1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 650:2
(Supp. 1977); N .J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:142:A-3 (West Supp. 1978); N .M. STAT. ANN.§ 3~6-1
(Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 263.05-.15 (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-190.6 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-27.1-03 (1976) (applies only to live performances); Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§ 2907.32.1 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1021.2 (West Supp. 1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 63!2(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978);
R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-9-l(b) (Supp. 1979); S.C. CoDE § 16-15-180 (1976); S.D. COMPILED
LA ws ANN.§ 22-22-23 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN ..§ 39-1019, 50-707(t) (Supp. 1978);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.23 (Vernon 1974); VA. CODE§ 18.2-379 (1975); w. VA.
CODE§ 6!-8A-6 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 940.203 (West Supp. 1979).
65
The coercer category includes those persons who cause, coerce, entice, induce, or
permit a child to appear in child pornography. 18 U .S.C.A. § 225l(a) (West Supp. 1978);
Alaska Stat. § 11.41.455 (Supp. 1978) (effective January I, 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3552 (West Pamph. Supp. 1978); CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.4 (West Supp. 1979);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53a-196a (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 847.014(2)(a)
(Harrison Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § ll-20a(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp.
1978); Act of June 5, 1978, Sen. File 2205, § I, 1978 Iowa Legis. Serv. 224 (to be codified
as IowA CoDE § 728); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3516 (Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT.
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have specific provisions making it a crime for a parent or legal
guardian to permit his child to engage in the production of child
pornography. 66 Finally, the federal law and twenty-seven states
impose criminal liability on the distributors and sellers of child
pornography. 67
In terms of comprehensiveness of coverage, only the federal law
and nine states have provisions that expressly impose criminal liability on all four classes of actors: producers, coercers, parents or
guardians, and distributors. 68 However, eleven other states reach
the four groups by imposing criminal liability on producers, distributors, and coercers, which includes parents. 69
B. Elements of the Offense

Typically, the statutes prohibit the production of, the distribu§ 531.310 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (West Supp. 1978);ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2922 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A (Supp.
1978); M1cH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.145c(2) (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 617.246 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.060 (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1979);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:32 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:142:A-2 (West
Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1 (Supp. 1978); N:Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05
(McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.6 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CooE
§ 12.1-27.1-03 (1976) (applies only to live performances); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 2919.22(8)(4) (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2 (West Supp. 1978);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6312(b) (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-9-l(b)
(Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-1019 (Supp. 1978); VA. CooE § 18.2-379 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.203 (West
Supp. 1979).
66 18 U .S.C.A. § 225 l(b) (West Supp. 1978); ALA. CooE tit. 13, § 7-236 (Supp. 1978);
CAL. PENAL CooE § 311.4 (West Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 53a-196a (West
Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § ll-20a(b)(3)(Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); KAN.
STAT. ANN.§ 21-3516 Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2922 (West Supp. 1978);
N .H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 169:32 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:142:A-2 (West Supp.
1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 263.05 (McKinney Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1021.3 (West Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.203(3) (West Supp. 1979).
67 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West Supp. 1978); ALA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 7-231 to 235 (Supp. 1978);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3508,-3553 (West Pamph. Supp. 1978); CAL. LAB. CooE
§§ 1309.5-.6 (West Supp. 1979); CAL. PENAL CooE §§ 3 ll.2(b),.4 (West Supp. 1979); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196b (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 1109 (Supp.
1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 847.014(2)(b) (Harrison Supp. 1978); HAW. REv. STAT.§ 707-751
(Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1l-20a(b)(I) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); IND.
CooE §§ 35-30-10.1-2 to 3 (Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT.§§ 531.340-.350 (Supp. 1978); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:81.1 (West Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2923 (West
Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS § 29A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.§ 750.145c(3) (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (West Supp. 1978);
NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28-1463(2) (Supp.1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 650:2 (Supp. 1977);
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:142:A-4 (West Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 263.10-.15
(McKinney Supp. 1978); OHIO REV. CooE ANN. § 2907.32.1 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1021.2(WestSupp. 1978); 18PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 6312(c)(Purdon
Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-9-1.1 (Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 22-2224 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CooE ANN. § 39-1019 (Supp. 1978); TEX. PENAL CooE ANN. tit. 9,
§ 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.203(4) (West Supp. 1979).
68 These states are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. For specific statutory citations, see notes 64-67
supra.
69

These states are Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
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tion of, the coercing of a child to appear in, and the granting of parental consent to a child to appear in:
(1) any print or visual materiaF 0
(2) that depicts a child 71
(3) engaged in certain sexual conduct. 72
With regard to the first element, about half of the laws require that
the visual material be legally obscene as a prerequisite for imposing
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Tennessee. For specific statutory cita-·
tions, see notes 64, 65, and 67 supra.
70 Print or visual material generally includes books, magazines, prints, negatives, slides,
motion pictures, or videotapes.
In Connecticut, Illinois, and Massachusetts, undeveloped materials are included. In United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977), statutory prohibitions against interstate
shipment of obscene materials were held to apply to unprocessed materials. Therefore, inclusion of undeveloped materials appears to be appropriate.
In addition, 20 states include live performances in this list. These states are Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. For specific statutory citations,
see note 60 supra.
On the federal level, a prohibition of live performances depicting children engaged in sexual conduct was contained in the Senate version of the bill. The provision was omitted by the
Conference Committee. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), re. printed in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 69, 70.
71
Sixteen states define a child as a person under 18 years old. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1-215, 13-3508,-3551 to 3555 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 11, § 1103 (Supp.
1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.014(1)(a) (Harrison Supp. 1978); GA. CooE ANN. §§ 54309.1, 74-104 (Harrison 1973 & Supp. 1978); low A CODE ANN.§ 728.1 (West Supp. 1978);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN.§ 750.145c (Supp. 1978) (under 18 unless emancipated); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 617.246
(West Supp. 1978); N .H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 650:1 (Supp. 1977); N .D. CENT. CODE§ 1410-01 (Supp. 1977); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN
LAWS § 11-9-1 to 1.1 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CooE ANN. §§ 39-1019, 50-707(t) (Supp. 1978);
VA. CooE §§ 1-13.42, 18.2-379 (1975); W. VA. CooE § 61-8A-6 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.203(6) (West Supp. 1979). Four states define a child as under 17 years old. ALA. CoDE
tit. 13, §§ 7-231 to 238 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:81.1 (West Supp. 1978); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 568.060 (Vernon Pamph. Supp. 1979); TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 9,
§§ 43.23, .25 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1978). The federal law and 16 states define a child as
under 16. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (West Supp. 1978); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.455 (Supp. 1978)
(effective January 1, 1980); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1309.5 (West Supp. 1979) and CAL. PENAL
CoDE § 311.4 (West Supp. 1979); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-193 (West Supp. 1979);
HAW. REv. STAT.§ 707-750 to 751 (Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3516 (Supp. 1978);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2921 (West Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 27, § 419A
(Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:142:A-1 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-6-1
(Supp. 1978); N.Y. Penal Law§ 263.00 (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14190.6 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. ·21, §§ 1021.2 to .3 (West Supp. 1978); 18 PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6312 (Purdon Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE§ 16-15-180 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.§§ 22-22-23 to 24 (Supp. 1978). In addition, two states define a child as a
person who is under 16 or appears as a prepubescent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20a
(Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28-1463 (Supp. 1978). Similarly, one
state defines a child as one who is or appears to be under 16. IND. CooE §§ 35-30-10.1-2 to 3
(Supp. 1978). Another state provides for two age classifications (16 and 18) and varies the
punishment according to the age of the victim. KY. REV. STAT. §§ 531.300-.370 (Supp.
1978).
72
Although the prohibited conduct varies from state to state, it generally includes the following: sexual intercourse (genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, oral-anal), bestiality,
masturbation, sexual sadomasochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area, excretory functions performed in a lewd manner, and, in a few jurisdictions, nudity. For a detailed
discussion of proscribed conduct, see notes 160-70 and accompanying text infra.
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criminal liability on the producer and distributor. 73 A minority of
states impose this requirement in regulating parents and coercers.74 In addition, several states require the material be produced
or distributed for commercial gain in order to impose liability. 75
Finally, as in all criminal statutes, the knowledge of the defendant
is an implicit element of the offense. The following subsections
73 Of the 39 state laws that regulate producers, 18 require the material to be obscene. ALA.
CODE tit. 13, § 7-237 (Supp. 1978); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 13-3508,-3552 (West Pamph.
Supp. 1978) (§ 13-3508 requires the material be obscene; § 13-3552 has no such requirement); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196a (West Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-20a(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); IND. CODE§§ 35-30-10.1-3, -42-4-4 (Supp.
1978) (§ 35-30-10.1-3 requires the material be obscene; § 35-42-4-4 has no such requirement); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 419A (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (West
Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1463(1) (Supp. 1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 650:2 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 263.05-.15 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (§ 263.10 requires the material be obscene; §§ 263.05, . 15 have no such requirement); N .C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-ICX>.6 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-27.1-03 (1976) (applies only to live performances); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§ 2CX>7.32.I (Page Supp. 1979); S.C. CoDE § 16-15-180
(1976); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 39-1019, 50-707(t) (Supp. 1978); TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 9,
§ 43.23 (Vernon 1974); VA. CODE§ 18.2-379 (1975); W. VA. CODE§ 61-8A-6(1977). Of the
27 states that regulate distributors, 13 require the material to be obscene. ALA. CoDE tit. 13,
§§ 7-231 to 235 (Supp. 1978); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3508,-3553 (West Pamph. Supp.
1978) (§ 13-3508 requires the material be obscene; § 13-3553 has no such requirement);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196b (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.014(2)(b)
(Harrison Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20a(b)(I) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp.
1978); IND. CoDE §§ 35-30-10.1-2 to 3 (Supp. 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2923
(West Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.246 (West Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-1463(2) (Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 650:2 (Supp. 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 263.10-.15 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (§ 263.10 requires the material be obscene;§ 263.15
has no such requirement); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.32.1 (Page Supp. 1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-1019 (Supp. 1978). On the federal level the material need not be obscene
with respect to producers, but with respect to distributors, the material must be obscene. 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2253 (West Supp. 1978).
Among those states that have obscenity requirements, the statutory definition of obscene
varies. Most use "obscene" as construed in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note
105 and accompanying text infra. Others use a "harmful to minors" definition similar to the
standard approved in Ginsberg v. New Yolk, 390 U.S. 629 ( 1968), discussed in note 107 and
accompanying text infra. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.014 (Harrison Supp. 1978).
Other states provide an affirmative defense, allowing the defendant to escape liability if the
material has a bona fide scientific, educational, or governmental justification. See, e.g.,
TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
74 Of the 29 states that regulate coercers, 10 require the material be obscene. CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN.§ 53a-196a (West Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20a(b)(3) (SmithHurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 27, § 419A (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 617.246 (West Supp. 1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:32 (Supp. 1977); N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 14-190.6 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 12.1-27.1-03 (1976) (applies only to
live performances); OHIO REV. CoDE ANN.§ 2919.22(8)(4) (Page Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE
ANN.§ 39-1019 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE§ 18.2-379 (1975). Of the 11 states that regulate parents and guardians, four require the material be obscene. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 7-236 (Supp.
1978); CbNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196a (West Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-20a(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:32. Under
the federal law, the material need not be obscene with respect to parents or coercers. 18
U .S.C.A. §§ 2251-2253 (West Supp. 1978).
75 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2253 (West Supp. 1978) ("for pecuniary profit"); ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.455 (Supp. 1978) (effective January 1, 1980); CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 311.2(b), .4 (West
Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-3516 (Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2922
(West Supp. 1978); MICH. Co MP. LAWS ANN. § 750.145c (Supp. 1978); Omo REV. CODE
ANN.§ 2907.32.1 (Page Supp. 1979); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.25 (Vernon Supp.
1978).
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undertake a detailed analysis of each of these elements, including a
discussion of the major constitutional issues associated with each.
1. Visual Material: The Necessity of an Obscenity
Requirement-Because child pornography production and distribution involves visual material, legislation regulating such material must be considered with due regard for first amendment freedoms. The weight to be accorded the first amendment interest is
best considered with respect to the four classes of actors involved
in the child pornography problem.
a. Producers-It is well established that the state has an interest
in protecting its children from various harms. 76 In Prince v. Massachusetts, 77 which upheld the constitutionality of a state law prohibiting street preaching by a minor, the United States Supreme
Court recognized the right of the state to intervene in the family
relationship where necessary for the child's welfare. 78 Similarly,
child labor laws 79 and other legislation protecting children 80 have
consistently been found constitutional. 81
The purpose of the child pornography laws is to control the
abuse of children. 82 Specifically, they were enacted to protect the
child from the harms inherent in the production of such material. 83
It is reasonable to conclude that statutes phrased in terms of proscribing the production of material involving the use of children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct are aimed at the harm to the
child. Consequently, regulation of the producer's activities seems
to be a reasonable exercise of a state's police power to protect its
children.
It is argued, however, that the producer's conduct also involves
an element of speech because the product of his activity is visual
material. 84 Yet, the Supreme Court has recognized that not all activities that incidentally involve speech have a protected speech
16
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944).
77 321 U .s. 158 (1944).
78
Id. at 166-67.
79
See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U .S.C. § 212 (1976), and the various state child labor
laws. For a recent analysis of the state child labor laws, see Note, Child Labor Laws-Time
to Grow Up, 59 MINN. L. REV. 575 (1975).
80 See, e.g., Child Protection and Toy Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1275 (West Cum.
Supp. 1979); Child Nutrition Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1771-1788 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5106 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
81
See, e.g., Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, 146 Ark. 448,225 S.W. 887 (1920); In re Spencer,
149Cal. 396, 86 P. 896 (1906); Lenahan v. Pittson Coal Min. Co., 218 Pa. 311, 67 A. 642 (1907)
(all upholding chikl. labor laws).
82
See S. REP. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 40, 53 (" ... the Committee intends to fill the existing gap in Federal
law by declaring that the use of children in the production of such materials is a form of
child abuse."); H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. II (1977).
83
See notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra.
84
See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
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element. 85 Indeed, if the concept of speech is extended absolutely
almost any activity can be thought to contain some type of speech
element. 86 Even ifit is conceded that the conduct of the producer
contains some element of speech, the state is arguably still justified
in prohibiting the use of children in the production of this material.
Under the "balancing of interests" test, 87 the state's interest in
protecting children arguably outweighs any free speech right of the
producer because of the nature of the harms suffered by the children. 88 Therefore, it would appear that the conduct of the producers may be prohibited, without regard to the legal status of the visual material. 89
In regulating the producer's activity, the legislatures have consistently made the judgment that the state's interest in protecting
its children outweighs any first amendment right the producer
might have in producing material depicting children engaged in certain sexual conduct. This legislative judgment appears constitu-

85
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("We cannot accept the view that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.").
86
Arguably, every action taken has a "communicative element." However, one must
draw the line somewhere. See generally Henkin, The Supreme Court, /967 Term Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1968).
87
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Basically, the balancing approach weighs the state's interest in regulating the activity against the
free speech interest of the actor.
88
The balancing approach is relied on below in determining whether an obscenity requirement is a prerequisite to the imposition of liability on distributors. The analysis concludes that, in light of the strong state interest in protecting the children, the distributor's
activity (containing a stronger free speech interest than the producer's activity) may be regulated without an obscenity requirement. See notes l01-134 and accompanying text infra.
That analysis is equally pertinent to the necessity of an obscenity requirement in the production process.
Under an alternative test, the "clear and present danger" test, the same conclusion is
reached. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), the Supreme Court held that
speech may be regulated when there is a clear and present danger connected with the exercise of that speech. The use of children in the production of materials depicting explicit sexual activity presents a distinct clear and present danger: physical, emotional, and psychological harm to the child. Thus, under this test, an obscenity requirement on producers does not
appear to be necessary. For the purposes of this analysis, the clear and present danger test is
not relied upon, because it i·s no longer universally accepted inAmericanjurisprudence. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, both
concurring, abandoned the clear and present danger test); Linde, "Clear and Present
Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163
(1970); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schneck to
Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 41.
89
It is important to note that this analysis assumes that all of the proscribed sexual conduct results in harm to the child. In order to find a clear and present danger or a strong interest in protecting children, the state must show the child is being harmed by the activity. This
implicit assumption highlights the importance of carefully defining prohibited sexual conduct. See notes 160-170 and accompanying text infra. At this point, the reader should recognize that the standard to be applied in reviewing prohibited sexual conduct is lower with
respect to producers than distributors. As long as minors are involved and there is no strong
speech interest affected, the state need only justify its regulation by showing a rational relationship between the prohibition and the prevention of harm to the child.
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tional, provided the prohibited sexual conduct is defined to only
include activities that harm the child. Thus, legislation regulating
producers need not require the ultimate product be obscene, and
those imposing this requirement are unnecessarily strict, provided
prohibited conduct covers only harmful activities. 90
b. Coercers-Persons who obtain children for purposes of appearing in sexually explicit conduct play an essential role in the
child pornography industry. These coercers are directly involved
in promoting the child abuse inherent in the production process.
Therefore, for the same reasons enunciated with respect to the
producer, 91 the state may prohibit coercive conduct. 92
Unlike the producer, the coercer has no argument that the activity involves an element of speech. 93 Regulation of the coercer is
simply a proscription of a certain type of conduct by a state as an
exercise of the police powers. Therefore, since there is no countervailing first amendment interest, to regulate coercers it is unnecessary to provide in a statute that the ultimate product be legally
obscene. 94
c. Parents and Guardians-Parents and guardians who allow
their children to engage in the proscribed activities are a subset of
the coercer group. Consequently, the substantive issues are identical, with one exception: regulation of the parent-child relationship
raises issues relating to the family and the role of the government in
the familial relationship.
The Supreme Court has recognized as fundamental the rights to
marital privacy and to raising a family. 95 In Prince v. Mas-

9
° For a list of these states, see note 73 supra. It should be noted that none of the statutes
regulating producers have been challenged in court. However, as discussed below, these
laws must be amended to narrow the definition of sexually explicit conduct if they are to
pass constitutional muster. See notes 160-170 and accompanying text infra.
In response to claims that a movie depicting a child engaged in prohibited conduct (regardless of the social value of the film) could no longer be legally produced in jurisdictions with
child pornography laws that do not contain an obscenity requirement, the use of actors that
appear to be young has been suggested as an alternative. Adult players appearing to be
young could be utilized to film any scenes involving prohibited conduct, just as stunt men
are used to film dangerous scenes in regular movies.
91
See notes 76-90 and accompanying text supra.
92
An analogy can be drawn to laws prohibiting prostitution. For example, inducing a child
to travel interstate to engage in prostitution is criminal under federal law. 18 U .S.C. § 2423
(1976).
93
While the producer group is directly engaged in making visual material, coercers are
one step removed from the production of the visual material.
94
For a list of states that unnecessarily require the material be obscene with respect to
liability of coercers, see note 74 supra. Note that the removal of the obscenity requirement is
dependent on a stricter definition of explicit sexual conduct. See notes 160-170 and accompanying text infra.
95
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.").
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sachusetts, 96 however, the Court, after acknowledging the conflict
between the state's interests in protecting the health, welfare, and
morals of its children and the "sacred private interests" associated
with the parental claim, held that under its parens patriae authority, the state had a duty to limit parental control by requiring school
attendance, regulating child labor, and otherwise protecting children against the evils of employment. 97 In addition, courts have
unanimously upheld statutes which make abandonment or nonsupport of one's children a criminal offense. 98 Finally, courts have
routinely held child abuse laws to be within a state's power although they intrude on the familial relationship. 99 Thus, it is clear
that the state, through its criminal laws, may legitimately intrude in
the familial relationship when the protection of the child is involved.
Since there is essentially no difference between state regulation
of coercers and parents in this context, it is unnecessary for statutes to impose an obscenity requirement as a prerequisite to criminal liability of parents. 100
d. Distributors-The regulation of distributors of child pornography raises more difficult constitutional ·questions than the regulation of the producers, coercers, and parents. The activities of the
distributor are one step removed from the direct abuse of children
present in the production process. Moreover, the distribution of
visual material has traditionally been afforded a high degree of protection under the first amendment. 101 At issue is the extent to
which the state may regulate the distribution and sale of material
depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
i. Free Speech Protections and the Balancing Approach-The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the proposition that freedom of speech and expression is the foundation of a free society. 1 02 The Court has in general afforded visual material the same
321 u .s. 158 (1944).
Id. at 166. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
98
See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 19Cal. App. 567, 126 P. 856(1912); People v. Bos, 162 Ill. App.
454 (1911); Ex parte Strong, 95 Tex. Crim. Rep. 250, 252 S.W. 767 (1923).
99
See, e.g., In re Van Vlack, 81 Cal. App. 2d 838, 185 P.2d 346 (1947); In re Edwards, 70
Misc. 2d 858, 335 N .Y.S. 2d 575 (1972); In re Fred S., 66 Misc. 2d 683, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 170
(1971); In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971) (sexual abuse). The child pornography statutes
which regulate certain parental conduct are merely a specific form of child abuse legislation.
10
° For a list of states that unnecessarily require the material be obscene with respect to
liability of parents, see note 74 supra.
101
See notes 102-17 and accompanying text infra.
102
"[T]he guarantee of freedom of speech and press .... is a social necessity required
for the 'maintenance of our political system and an open society.' "Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967) (citations omitted). See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
509 (1946); A. MEIKEUOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948). The relationship between free speech and a free society is not of recent vintage. See
Emperor Domitian, Apothegem (C.A.D. 90) ("In libera civitate opertet etiam linguas esse
96

91

WINTER

1979]

Child Pornography Legislation

313

first amendment protection as speech. 103 The Court has consistently held, however, that the state may constitutionally regulate
the distribution of obscene materials. 104
The current test for judging whether a work is obscene was articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California. 105 The
Court ruled that a work is obscene if: (a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 106 In Ginsberg v. New York, 101 the Court specifically
recognized a state's power to prohibit the dissemination of sexually
explicit material which is not obscene by adult standards. 1 08 The
state may make the distribution of such materials to minors a criminal offense. 109
The obscenity laws are premised on the prevention of harm to
society resulting from adult exposure to these materials. 110 Although the extent of this harm is an unsettled issue, 111 the Suliberas" -In a free state there must be free speech), quoted in THE HOME BooK OF PROVERBS. MAXIMS AND FAMILIAR PHRASES 2191 (1948).
103
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952). See also Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Kingsley
Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
10 • This proposition was first recognized in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
l05 413 u .s. 15 (1973).
10
• Id. at 24.
107
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
1 08 The"harmful to minors" test upheld in Ginsberg examines (a) whether the material
appeals to the prurient interest of the average minor, (b) whether the material is patently
offensive to the prevailing standard in the adult community as a whole with respect to what
is suitable for minors, and (c) whether the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value for minors. This broader definition of obscenity was approved, based on
the state's interest in protecting its children. Id. at 632-33.
109 See generally Israel & Burns, Juvenile Obscenity Statutes: A Proposal and Analysis, 9
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 413 (1976).
110
In W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASESCOMMENTS-QUESTIONS 988-89 (4th ed. 1975), the authors suggest the following objectives
of the obscenity laws:
(I) To prevent the stimulation of behavior that is illegal or inconsistent with existing moral standards.
(2) To prevent a change in the accepted moral laws and standards of the community through gradual eroding away of community support for such standards.
(3) To maintain the moral tone of the community against the "sin of obscenity"
which is assumed to "corrupt morals and character" by stimulating immoral
thoughts and desires, independent of whether it stimulates immoral behavior.
(4) To prevent the arousal of feelings of disgust and revulsion by affronting individuals with shockingly offensive events or materials.
(5) To prevent the commercialized stimulation of psycho-sexual tensions.
(6) To protect children from the adverse effects mentioned above, often thought
to be more harmful to children because of their intellectual and emotional immaturity.
111

See notes 37 and 41 supra.
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preme Court has cited the decay of the quality of life and the threat
of related sex crimes as justification for the obscenity laws. 112 To
the extent that the child pornography statutes are based on these
same objectives-prevention of harm resulting from viewing such
material-it would appear that prohibiting distribution must be limited to legally obscene materials.
As has been previously emphasized, however, the primary purpose of child pornography statutes is to prevent child abuse. 113
The Miller standard recognizes the protection of society from the
harm of viewing sexually oriented materials as the only interest
competing with the fundamental freedom of speech interest. When
an additional competing interest is added to the balance, namely
the state's interest in protecting its children from sexually oriented
visual materials, the Supreme Court has been willing to extend the
area of nonprotected speech. 114 Therefore, the determination of
regulation of free speech ultimately becomes a balancing test between free speech interests and other state interests. 115 The test
must be applied in light of the great respect accorded to free speech
and the precise nature of the state's interest in protecting its children. To assure that speech interests are adequately protected, the
Court has developed two standards which must be considered in
determining the constitutionality of child pornography statutes.
First, legislation with a constitutional purpose can, through too
112
Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-61 (1973). See also Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (state may act to protect "the social interest in order and
morality").
11 3
See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
11
• See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
115
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 ( 1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Contra United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967).
As an alternative, other commentators have relied on the so-called O'Brien test, in analyzing the constitutionality of child pornography statutes. See Commet, supra note 12, at 830;
House Crime Hearings, supra, note l, at 137 (testimony of John Keeney, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice). In fact, the preamble to the Kentucky law contains a summary of the
O'Brien test as authority for its law which does not include an obscenity requirement. Act of
March 30, 1978, ch. 219, 1978 Ky. Rev. Stat. & Rules Serv. 659 (statute codified, except for
preamble, in KY. REV. STAT.§§ 529.030, 531.300-.370). This test was developed from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which a criminal statute prohibiting the destruction of a draft card was held constitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that when
"speech" and "non-speech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, government regulation is sufficiently justified (I) if it is within the constitutional power of the
government, (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of free expression, and (3) if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment rights is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377. The
O'Brien test turns on a distinction between "speech" and "conduct." Several commentators have questioned the validity of such a distinction. See Henkin, The Supreme
Court, 1%7 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1968); Nimmer, The
Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29 (1973).
The balancing of interests approach is a more appropriate scheme of analysis than the O'Brien test.

WINTER

1979]

Child Pornography Legislation

315

broad a sweep, become unconstitutional in its overbreadth. 116
Second, the Court in considering conflicts between state regulatory
powers and first amendment rights has suggested that if an alternative means of regulation exists, which does not infringe on individual rights, the state must adopt the least restrictive alternative.117
ii. State's Interest-The state's right to protect its children from
the harms inherent in the production of child pornography is undisputed.118 Nonetheless a distributor is not directly engaged in physical abuse of children. 119 Arguably, however, the distributor aids
and abets the producer's abuse of children by serving as the vital
link in the industry between the market and the production process. The economic incentives to produce are provided by the distributor's activities. Without these economic incentives, production of child pornography and the connected child abuse would be
severely curtailed. Proponents of the legislation aimed at distributors argue that sanctions directed toward the economic center
of the industry, rather than the production center, are the only effective means of ending the use of children for these purposes . 120
From a prosecutorial viewpoint, the passage of criminal laws
aimed at producers without similar regulation of distributors will
arguably shift the production process further underground. 121
Prosecution will become even more difficult. Since locating the
material is easier than locating and proving the use of the production facilities, successful prosecution of the distributors is more
likely than prosecution of producers. 122 Additionally, because of
the economics of the pornography industry, prosecution of the distributors would be much more effective in _eliminating the abuse of
children.
The state has a further interest in protecting the child from the
psychological harm incurred in knowing the material has been pub116 "A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114
(1972) (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1967)). See also Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970); Annot., 45 L. Ed. 2d 725
(Supreme Court's views as to overbreadth of legislation in connection with first amendment
rights).
117
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967). See also Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U .s. 141, 148-49 (1943).
118 See notes 76-81 and accompanying text supra.
119
The publication and distribution of child pornography may, however, cause
psychological harm to the child victim. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
120
See, e.g., House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 167 (statement of Rep. John W.
Murphy) ("Production will stop if there is no market for results, or the penalties for transporting and marketing make it impossible to do business economically or profitably").
12 1
Id. at 125 (testimony of Heather G. Florence, American Civil Liberties Union).
122
Id. at 34 (testimony of Charles Rembar, pornography defense attorney).
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licly circulated . 123 In addition to the state's interest in protecting
its children, the statutes aimed at the distributors also regulate the
alleged harm to society . 124
iii. Striking the Balance Between the First Amendment and the
State's Interests-The constitutionality of legislation must be considered initially in light of the principle requiring legislation to
minimize first amendment intrusions by employing the least restrictive regulatory scheme. 125 The goal of preventing child abuse,
while minimally affecting distributor's rights, can arguably be most
directly accomplished through the specific regulation of producers.
Under this standard, pornography statutes aimed at producers and
coercers, and statutes outlawing sexual molestation and sexual
abuse of children, would be constitutionally permissible. The activities of distributors would not be regulated beyond the requirement that the material they sell be nonobscene, which may cover
some, but not necessarily all the material showing children in sexually explicit activities. Acceptance of this approach is premised on
the belief that regulation of production is sufficient to prevent the
child abuse inherent in the production of such material.
A strong argument has been made, however, that mere regulation of the producers and coercers would not effectively deter the
child abuse. 126 Without legislation aimed at the economic center of
the industry, other legislation will be ineffective. This argument
has prevailed in the federal child labor laws which prohibit not only
the use of children in the manufacturing process, but also the shipment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by children.127 The proposition that regulation of the distributors is the
only way to effectively prevent the sexual abuse of children inherent in child pornography requires an examination of the extent to
which the distributor's activity may be constitutionally regulated.
In considering the conflicting interests, the weight of the first

123
In civil cases, such a harm has been held to be recompensable on an invasion of privacy theory. These cases are based on a theory recognizing the harm emanating from public
disclosure of private facts. See W. PROSSER, LA w OF TORTS 809-12 (4th ed. 1971). See also
Myers v. U.S. Camera Publishing Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d n1 (1957).Every child has the right to
be free from public exposure of his body and sexual activities. In his dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928), Mr. Justice Brandeis characterized "the right to be
let alone" as "the right most valued by civilized men."
While damages have been allowed under an invasion of privacy theory of public disclosure of private facts, no criminal statute has ever been founded on such a theory. The state's
interest in this instance is better characterized as protection of the child from emotional and
psychological harm, rather than protection of the child's privacy interest.
12
• See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
125
See note 117 supra.
126
See notes 120-22 and accompanying text supra.
127 29 U .S.C. § 212 (1976). Of course, in the case of child labor, the fundamental first
amendment interests are not involved._
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amendment interest is essentially fixed, 128 but the harm suffered
by the child arguably varies according to the age of the child and
the nature of the sexual conduct in which he or she is engaged.
Conduct which unquestionably causes severe harm to the victim
would include any type of sexual sadomasochistic abuse involving
a young child. Conduct resulting in relatively little harm is ,the depiction of an older child's genitals. With acts such as masturbation,
the severity of harm would arguably depend upon the age of the
child.
The current laws regulating child pornography do not recognize
a sliding scale of harms and classify all the acts with a child of any
age as prohibited. 129 Because of this single broad class of harms,
encompassing all types of sexual acts and children of all ages, these
laws, when applied to distributors, could be attacked as overbroad,
since in some instances they may impose liability when no harm
has resulted to the child. 130 While the lines drawn by the statutes
regarding prohibited activities and age of the victim are arbitrary, 131 if prohibited sexual conduct is narrowly defined and age
limitations are reasonable, the sweep of the statute will most often
only include conduct that is harmful to children. 132 The Supreme
Court has recognized that "incidental" overbreadth is permissible,
even when first amendment freedoms are at stake. 133 Therefore, so
long as proscribed sexual conduct is narrowly defined, the balance
between the state's interest in protecting its children and distributors' and viewers' free speech interests tips toward allowing
regulation. Under this analysis, a statute imposing liability on dis128
Even though the child pornography statutes purport to regulate the abuse of children,
the effect of the regulation is to deny the distributors an opportunity to sell and show the
material and to deny the audience an opportunity to view the material.
129
See note 72 supra, and notes 160-70 and accompanying text infra.
.
13
° For example, some seventeen year-olds will not suffer physical or psychological harm
in having their genitals photographed or in having such photographs widely circulated.
131 The lines are arbitrary in the sense that the harm to the victim is not assured in each
case. The lines are also arbitrary in their failure to distinguish between severe harms and
slight harms. Presumably, this failure to distinguish merely reflects the legislative judgment
that the lesser harms are sufficient to impose liability on the distributors.
132
The few instances in which the statutes may be too broad would probably be those
cases where an older child is engaged in prohibited behavior (e.g., sexual intercourse) without physical or psychological harm to him. This incidental overbreadth arises out of the objective lines drawn by the statute in defining maturity and explicit sexual conduct. Such incidental overbreadth may be analogous to the statutes that prohibit dissemination of certain
sexually explicit materials to minors. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Under
those statutes, some children, although younger than the age of majority, may be mature
enough to view the prohibited material. Nonetheless, the state is justified in imposing criminal sanctions on those persons who disseminate certain explicit material to such a child. See
Israel & Bums, supra note 109.
133 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,615 (1973) (''To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not ·merely speech is 10volved, we believe that the overbreadth
of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well.judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep.").

318

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 12:2

tributors of visual material depicting children in sexual activity, regardless of whether the material is legally obscene, is constitutional, so long as "sexual activity" is properly defined. The definitions of sexual activity in the current statutes are, however, too
broad to withstand constitutional challenge. 134
e. Review of Present Case Law-The first statute to be challenged was the Texas statute making it a felony for a person to
commercially possess, exhibit, distribute, or sell "any motion picture or photograph showing a person younger than 17 years of age
observing or engaging in sexual conduct." 135 In Graham v. Hill, 136
an action for declaratory relief brought by the owner and manager
of a movie theater and bookstore, a federal district court held the
statute unconstitutionally overbroad. 137 The court found that the
statute could not be justified as a measure to protect the welfare of
children, because the statute prohibited some conduct that was not
harmful to the child actors, resulting in an infringement of the distributor's first amendment rights. 138 The court noted, however,
that if the statute were limited to prohibiting activities that were actually harmful to children, the law would be constitutional. 139
The New York statute is the other statute that has been challenged in court. In People v. Ferber, 140 the defendant, a distributor, moved to dismiss an indictment under the New York statute on constitutional grounds. The court ruled that the New York
statute, 141 aimed at both producers and distributors, was constitutional. The statute makes it a felony for a person to produce, direct,
or promote 1 42 any 143 performance 144 which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age. The court in addressing the overbreadth challenge recognized the legislative intent to

134

See notes 160-70 and accompanying text infra.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 43.25 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
136
444 F. Supp. 584 (W. D. Tex. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1622 (5th Cir. April 4,
1978).
137
Id. at 592.
138
Id. at 592-93.
139
"If the statute were limited to prohibiting the depiction of minors actually engaging in
sexual conduct, or even if the statute merely prohibited the observance of actual sexual conduct by minors, the Court would likely have no hesitation in declaring its constitutionality."
Id. at 592. The court suggests that an obscenity requirement may be necessary to assure the
constitutionality of the statute, but then implies that the statute would be constitutional if it
was limited to prohibiting sexual exploitation of children. Id. at 592-93.
140
96 Misc. 2d 669, 409 N .Y.S.2d 632 (1978).
141
N.Y. PENAL CODE§§ 263.10-.15 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
142
" 'Promote' means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same." Id. § 263.00(5).
143
Under id. § 263.15, the performance does not have to be obscene, while under id.
§ 263.10, a narrower statute, the performance must be obscene.
144
" 'Performance' means any play, motion picture, photograph or dance. Performance
also means any other visual representation exhibited before an audience." Id.§ 263.00(4).
135
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prohibit sexual conduct by a child, even if the performance is
within a constitutionally protected context. 145 In balancing between "the right of freedom of expression" and "the right of the
Legislature to protect children against sexual exploitation" 146 the
court held the balance to be in favor of the protection of children.147
Given the paucity of decisions, it is impossible to discern a trend
in the case law. Both the New York and Texas cases can be read,
however, as upholding a state's power to protect children against
actual harms by regulating the distribution of child pornography
without an obscenity requirement. The best decisions will be rendered when the harms to the child victim and the various interests
of the state and the defendants are recognized and fully articulated.
Only then can a just balance be struck between the state's police
power and the first amendment interests protected by the Constitution.
2. Age of the Victim-The age of minority in the child pornography statutes varies from sixteen to eighteen years. 148 Although
the line drawn between childhood and adulthood is arbitrary, the
practical impossibility of making a subjective inquiry into the
maturity of each individual child victim makes use of a flat age
limit reasonable. Flat age limits have been upheld in various con-

People v. Ferber, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
Id.
147
The court, in discussing both the state's interests and free speech interests, noted that
reasonable alternatives are open to the producers of such material, such as using a child
older than 16 years who appears younger. The court also suggests that certain acts could be
legally simulated within the bounds of the New York statute. Id. The New York law defines
"simulated" as the explicit depiction of any sexual conduct which creates the appearance of
such conduct and which exhibits any uncovered portion of the breast, genitals or buttocks.
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 263.00(6) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
The New York statute had been previously challenged by the publisher of Show Me!, a
controversial sex education book depicting children engaged in explicit sexual conduct. The
publishers and distributors of this book have sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Although the declaratory issue has not been decided, a federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against New York state officials, enjoining application of the statute pending
resolution of the declaratory issue. St. Martin's Press, Inc. v. Carey, 440 F. Supp. 1196
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the case did not involve a case or controversy justifying federal court intervention. St. Martin's Press, Inc. v.
Carey, Nos. 77-7603, 77-7623, 78-7027, slip op. (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 1979). Although the opinion
focused primarily on the procedural issue, the court found that the book would not be covered by the statute because the photographs were taken in 1973, four years prior to passage
of the statute, outside the United States. Id. at 5356. Implying that the statute is aimed at
preventing harm to children, the court said: "We fail to see how the New York legislature in
1977 could have had any legitimate concern with the welfare of German children in the years
before 1973 .... "Id. at 5356. In a strong dissenting opinion, Judge Timbers disagreed with
the majority on this point, maintaining the statute clearly covered Show Me! Id. at 5361.
Beyond this simple recognition of the statutory purpose to protect children, the case did not
speak to the overbreadth issue.
148
See note 71 supra.
145

14•
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texts, including drinking age, 149 curfew statutes, 150 and operation
of motor vehicles. 151 Where the age limits vary with the different
statutes, the oldest age used is eighteen. Within the context of protecting a child from sexual abuse, drawing the line at eighteen years
old does not appear to be beyond legislative reason. Therefore,
child pornography statutes should be held constitutional in this regard.
The only statutes that are questionable are those that define a
child as a person who is under sixteen or appears as a prepubescent, 152 and the one that defines a child as one who is or appears to
be under sixteen. 153 These statutes could be applied to consenting
adults who appear to be young. Since child pornography statutes
are premised on protecting children from actual harm, these definitions extend the state police power too far. The state has no legitimate interest in prohibiting adults from posing for sexually explicit
materials, unless that material is obscene. 154 Therefore, these definitions are unconstitutionally broad.
To establish the liability of the defendant, the state must prove
that a minor was actually depicted in the material. In practice, this
could prove to be a major hurdle for prosecutors. It is often impossible to find these children for the purposes of testifying in
court. 155 To circumvent this problem, several states-provide that
expert medical testimony, which is based upon the child's physical
appearance through inspection of the visual material, is admissible,
and possibly conclusive evidence of the child's age. 156
In a variety of contexts courts have held that the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be considered in judging
his or her age. 157 Thisjudgment, however, has always been made
149

Houser v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 803, 540 P.2d 412 (1975).
See Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See also
Note, Juvenile Curfew Statutes and the Constitution, 76 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1977); 54 TEX.
L. REV. 812 (1976).
151
State ex rel. Oleson v. Graunke, ll9 Neb. 440, 229 N. W. 329 (1930); Plunkett v. Heath,
I N.Y.S. 2d 778 (1938); Belberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977).
152
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § ll-20a(a)(l)(A) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 28-1463 to 1464 (Supp. 1978).
153
IND. CODE§§ 35-30-10.1-2 to 3 (Supp. 1978).
154
See text accompanying notes 105-06 supra.
155
House Crime Hearings, supra note l, at 64-65 (testimony of L. Martin, Los Angeles
Police Department).
156
ALA. CODE. tit. 13, § 7-233(b)(Supp. 1978) (jury may make judgment regarding age
without expert testimony); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp.
1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 750.145c (Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 263.25 (McKinney
Supp. 1978) (jury may make judgment regarding age without expert testimony); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN.§ 6312(d) (Purdon Supp. 1978) (expert testimony "sufficient" to establish age).
See also N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A: 142:A-5 (West Supp. 1978) (person appearing in photograph
or film as under 16 rebuttably presumed to be under the age of 16).
157
See Lew Git Cheung v. Nagle, 36 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1929) (age ofa Chinese applicant
for citizenship); Manship v. People, 99 Colo. l, 58 P.2d 1215 (1936) (age of statutory rape
victim); People v. Kaminsky, 208 N .Y. 389, 102 N.E. 515 (1913) (age of juvenile offender).
150

WINTER

1979)

Child Pornography Legislation

321

by viewing the victim when physically present in the courtroom. 158
In those cases, such evidence has been found admissible, but
rarely conclusive. 159 Under the provisions considered here, the
victim would be present only on film. Age judgments should, therefore, be made only by an expert well versed in the deceptive nature
of photographs and the various problems of judging age from appearances. The appropriate weight to be given the evidence will
necessarily have to be determined by the trial judge. But such evidence should only be used as conclusive proof of minority in cases
where the child is dearly under the statutory-age of minority.
3. Proscribed Sexual Conduct-A precise definition of prohibited sexual conduct is crucial if statutes which do not have an
obscenity requirement are to withstand constitutional attacks . 160
To prevent unconstitutional overbreadth, the prohibited sexual
conduct must be confined to those activities that cause harm to the
child actor. Harm can be in the form of physical, psychological,
and emotional hardship to the child. The child may also be harmed
by viewing explicit sexual conduct. 161
Less clear is the harm associated with the conditions surrounding production. 162 Although there may be a close connection between molestation and production in some cases, the state, in
enacting child pornography legislation, cannot assume the child is
harmed away from the camera. Therefore, the statutes should not
be premised on the harm resulting to the child through molestation
away from the camera. Rather, the statutes should be concerned
with the harm resulting to the child through engaging in sexual
conduct with other children and adults. Prosecution of off camera
sexual molestation of children by adults can be reached under
existing sex crime laws.
Unquestionably, the child is psychologically and emotionally
harmed when forced to engage in any type of sexual intercourse, 163

See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 222 (3d ed. 1940).
158 See Slaughter v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 338 (D.C. 1957); Cunningham v. United States, 86 A.2d 918 (D.C. 1952); State v. Fries, 246 Wis. 521, 17 N .W.2d 578 (1945). But
see People v. Grizzle, 381 Ill. 278, 44 N.E.2d 917 (1942).
159 See cases cited in note 158 supra.
160
See notes 76-90 and 101-34 and accompanying text supra.
161
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting children from viewing certain sexual
conduct depicted in visual material. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). This interest would extend to a prohibition against children viewing live sexual conduct as well.
162
See notes 29-36 and accompanying text supra. As noted earlier, the sex crime statutes
are particularly inadequate due to their failure to cover forced sexual conduct between children. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
163
Sexual intercourse should be defined in the statute to include genital-genital, oralgenital, anal-genital, and oral-anal intercourse.
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bestiality, or sadomasochism. 164 Further, the child may incur
physical harm by engaging in any of these activities. The same
emotional and psychological harm is incurred when the child simulates these acts. 165 Thus, the state seems justified in enumerating
actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, and
sadomasochistic abuse as prohibited sexual conduct.
The difficult definitional problems arise in the context of masturbation, and another person's fondling of and exhibition of the
child's genitalia. For purposes of this analysis, all of these activities can be thought of as exhibition of the child's genitalia. 166
There may be situations where such activity will harm the child
psychologically, particularly where the child is young and participating in hard core films. However, exhibition of the genitals
may not be considered harmful in many other types of films or
photographs. 167 A broad prohibition against exhibition of the genitals could cover situations in which the child is not harmed in production or by the knowledge that his picture is widely distributed.
The harmful situations are arguably those in which the context of
the nudity would tend to debase the child's view of his body or
sexuality. In other situations, the child is not harmed, and thus,
does not need the protection of the statute . 168
The problem is establishing the line between harmful exhibition
of the genitals and non-harmful exhibition. Since much of the harm
is psychological, prohibited exhibition of the genitals could be defined as exhibition of the genitals that, according to accepted
psychiatric evidence, tends to harm the child psychologically or
emotionally. For the purposes of this definition, an expert witness
could be free to consider the age of the child and the context in

164

Sadomasochism is variously defined by the statutes. Some states require the activity

to be sexually related. E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2253(2)(0) (West Supp. 1978). This appears to be
an unnecessary requirement. If the child is being harmed through the sadomasochistic
abuse, the sexual gratification of the abuser should be irrelevant. Further, definitions should
not restrict the activity by requiring bizarre costumes or other sexual trappings. See, e.g.,
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 235.20(5) (McKinney 1967). "Sadism" and "masochism" should be ac-

corded their common dictionary meaning in interpreting the statutes.
165
"Simulates" should be simply defined as the depiction of conduct which creates the
appearance of such conduct. In instances of simulation, the child still suffers the same
psychological and emotional harm as if he or she was actually engaged in the act.
166
Another person fondling the genitalia of a child may be distinguishable on the grounds
that the child's body space is physically invaded. However, the major harm resulting from
the activity appears to be similar to that of masturbation and exhibition of the genitals:
psychological and emotional injury. Thus, all three will be considered together.
167
For example, a depiction of a young naked boy in a context such as a diaper advertisement would not be harmful to the child.
168
Although the child may not be physically, emotionally, or psychologically harmed, the
child still retains the right to be free from commercial exploitation. Many states have special
provisions in their child labor laws affording protection to children who appear in a film or
theatrical performance. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 31.8 (Smith-Hurd 1969); N.Y.
Eouc. LAW§ 3229 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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which the child's genitals are depicted. This definition would place
a burden on prosecutors to present expert testimony regarding the
harm to the child, but only in cases where the child was merely depicted with exposed genitalia. In all other instances the prohibited
conduct would be explicitly defined and the state would not have
the burden of presenting affirmative evidence that the child was
harmed. As a practical matter, the burden placed on prosecutors
will probably be slight, since most prosecutions are likely to be
against producers and distributors of material that depicts a child
engaged in actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, or
sadomasochistic abuse. 169
In summary, ''sexually explicit conduct,'' for purposes of the
statute, should be defined as (1) actual or simulated sexual intercourse (genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, oral-anal), (2) actual or simulated bestiality, (3) actual or simulated sadomasochistic
abuse, and (4) exhibition of the child's genitals that, according to
accepted psychiatric evidence, tends to harm the child psychologically or emotionally. The psychological expert witness is free to
consider the age of the child and the context in which the child's
genitals are depicted. Since each category of prohibited activity defines activities which will impose harm on a child, the child pornography statutes which do not have an obscenity requirement can
withstand constitutional attack . 170
4. Commercial Requirement-Seven of the state laws and the
federal law require that the production be for pecuniary profit or
commercial exploitation. 171 While the state legislatures may include this requirement, presumably to protect an area of privacy,
this requirement appears to be constitutionally unnecessary. The
· state police power to protect its children extends beyond commercial activity. 172 Producers of child pornography are arguably engaged in culpable child abuse regardless of their motive. The commercial exploitation requirement in state statutes appears to be an
unnecessary impediment to meeting the objective of preventing
this form of child abuse. To come within the commerce clause
however the federal law must contain the commercial requirement.11a
169 Although most of this conduct would be considered obscene under existing obscenity
statutes, under the child pornography laws, the state would be saved the substantial burden
of proving the material was legally obscene. See notes 53-58 and accompanying text supra.
110
See notes 90 & 134 and accompanying text supra.
17 1
See note 75 supra.
172 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
173
In recent years, federal regulation of criminal activities based on the commerce clause
has become more widespread. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Stern, The
Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271
(1973); Note, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972
U. ILL L.F. 805.
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5. Mental Element-Many of the state child pornography laws
contain broad provisions which require that to incur criminal liability a defendant must knowingly undertake the proscribed activity. 174 Two key factors in a knowledge requirement-the context
of the material and the age of the child-will be examined. 175
a. Content-i. Producer-For producers, specific knowledge of
the content is not necessary. Since producers are directly involved
in the abusive acts, knowledge of the nature of the material is inherent in the process production. The state need only prove that
the defendant actually produced the material. 176
ii. Distributors-The Supreme Court on several occasions has addressed the constitutional question of the extent to which the distributor must have knowledge of the content of the material sold or
exhibited before criminal liability is imposed.
In Smith v. California, 177 the Supreme Court struck down as a
violation of the first amendment a Los Angeles obscenity ordinance that imposed strict criminal responsibility without requiring
"any element of scienter" for possession of obscene material in a
place where books were sold. The Court recognized that mens rea
is the rule, rather than the exception, to the principles of AngloAmerican jurisprudence, 1 78 but noted further that strict liability
crimes are appropriate in some cases. 1 79 The Court ruled, however, that elimination of scienter in such a case would work a sub~
·stantial restriction on the freedom of speech and press.
However, in Hamling v. United States, 180 the Court ruled that
under the federal statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene
material, it is unnecessary to prove the defendant knew the materials were legally obscene. It is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of scienter ''that the prosecution show that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials he distributed, and that he knew the character and nature of th_e materials.,, 181
The scienter requirement on distributors can be extended to in174
Some statutes expressly define the knowledge requirement. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit.
13, § 7-230(4) (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 847.014(1)(g) (Harrison Supp. 1978). Other
states simply express the knowledge requirement in broad terms. See, e.g., N .J. STAT.
ANN.§ 2A:142:A-4 (West Supp. 1978) ("knowingly"); N.Y. PENAL LAW§§ 263.10-.15
(McKinney Supp. 1978) ("knowing the character and content thereof").
175
Under the federal law, the knowledge requirement also arises with respect to knowledge of the interstate transportation of the visual material. 18 U .S.C.A. §§ 2251-2252 (West
Supp. 1978). Federaljurisdiction rests on this interstate transportation requirement. The requisite knowledge of this interstate effect is an issue beyond the scope of this article.
176
See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW, 191-204 (1972).
177
361 U.S. 147 (1959).
178
Id. at 150.
11• Id.
180 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
181 Id. at 123.
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elude situations in which the defendant had reason to know the
character and content of the material. In Ginsberg v. New York, 182
a case reviewi'ng a conviction under the New York statute prohibiting distribution of obscene materials to minors, the Supreme Court
approved a scienter requirement which allowed convictions when
the defendant knew or had reason to know "the character and content of any material ... which is reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant.'' 183 In Hamling, the Court cited with approval this portion of Gins berg upholding the objective scien ter requirement. 184
With respect to the child pornography statutes, Hamling and
Ginsberg require that the distributor know or have reason to know
the character and content of the material which is reasonably susceptible of examination. In order to assure this effect, the statutes
should include a definition of "knowingly" expressly incorporating
such an interpretation. 185 The act of distributing or intent to distribute child pornography must also be established to impose criminal
liability.
Several states provide that possession of a certain number of
copies of the same article shall be prima facie evidence of intent to
disseminate. 186 As a general principle, the "possession of instruments, tools, or other means of doing the act is admissible as a significant circumstance; the possession signifies a probable design to

390 U.S. 629 (1968).
/d. at 643. The old New York provision, N.Y. PENAL LAW OF 1909 § 484-h(l)(g), reprinted in N.Y. PENAL LAW app., at 387 (McKinney 1967), read as follows:
182

183

"Knowingly" means having general knowledge of, or reason to know, or a belief or
ground for belief which-warrants further inspection or inquiry of both:
(i) the character and content of any material described herein which is reasonably
susceptible of examination by the defendant, and
(ii) [provision dealing with the age of the child].
184
185

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 123.
For an example of such a provision, see ALA. CODE§ 13-7-230(4)(Supp. 1978):

"Knowingly" means a person knowingly disseminates or publicly displays
obscene matter when the person knows the nature of the matter. A person knows
the nature of the matter when either of the following circumstances exist:
a. The person is aware of the character and content cr the matter, or
b. The person recklessly disregards circumstances suggesting the character and
content of the matter.
The Florida law provides that a person in possession of the child pornographic goods, after
service of summons and complaints, is chargeable with knowledge of the content or character thereof. FLA. STAT. ANN'. § 847.014(3)(e) (Harrison Supp. 1978). Under Hamling and
basic notions of fairness, a defendant should not be charged with the requisite knowledge at
the time of the alleged violation simply because he is served with a summons and complaint.
186
ALA. CODE§ 13-7-232 (Supp. 1978) (6 copies); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1109(3) (Supp.
1978) (one movie); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § ll-20a(d) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978) (4
copies); Kv. REV. STAT.§ 531.340(Supp. 1978)(one copy); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:81.l(B)
(West Supp. 1978) (3 copies); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2923(2) (West Supp. 1978) (10
copies).
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use.'' 187 This principle has been applied in a variety of contexts including burglary, arson, selling liquor illegally, forgery, counterfeiting, and murder by the use of knife, gun, or poison . 188 The
common thread in all these cases is the relevancy of the conduct to
the intent to commit the crime. 189 In the child pornography context, possession of several copies of the same work seems closely
related to an intent to disseminate. Normally a person would not
keep extra copies of a pornographic work unless he intended to sell
copies. The precise number of copies necessary to make this link is
not fixed, but can be left to the discretion of the legislature. 190 This
type of provision will be most effective in those states which make
criminal the possession of prohibited material with intent to disseminate.191 Such a provision may also be helpful in proving an
attempt to commit the substantive offense.
iii. Coercer and Parents-Based on the underlying policy objectives of the child pornography laws, coercers should be held to an
objective standard of knowledge of the content, while parents are
more appropriately held to a subjective standard. The objective
standard is appropriately applied to coercers in light of the commercial nature of the coercer's activity. A person hired to obtain
children for purposes of posing and acting is entrusted with the responsibility of informing parents of the purposes for which their
child is to be used. In essence, an objective scienter requirement
imposes a duty on the person seeking children for films or photographs to make reasonable inquiry into the nature of the visual
material. The imposition of this duty seems reasonable in light of
the position of trust held by the coercer.
The subjective standard appears more appropriate for parents.
Imposition of an objective standard would place liability on parents
who were unable to meet such a standard due to lack of mental
capacity or other circumstances. While such a parent might be subject to sanctions or treatment under child neglect laws, 192 the law
should not impose a harsh criminal sanction on those who fail to
make a reasonable investigation of the activities in which their
children are engaged. Holding parents to a subjeetive standard ap187
2 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 238 (3d ed. 1940) (italics deleted). This only applies to prove
design or plan to commit a crime and should be distinguished from possession as evidence of
having committed the crime.
1ss 1d.
189
/d. "Any attempt to reconcile all these rulings is hopeless .... The question is always
one of experience and common sense in each case." Id.
190
Under the statutes of six states that have such a provision, the number of copies ranges
from one to ten. See note 186 supra.
191
See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 531.340 (Supp. 1978).
192
See Katz, Howe, & McGrath, supra note 49.
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propriately limits the state's intrusion into the family relationship.
b. Age of the Child-Seven states explicitly provide that the defendant must have knowledge of the child's minority, 193 while several other states allow lack of knowledge to be pleaded as an affirmative defense. 194 The issue is whether knowledge of the child's
age is a necessary element of the offense.
In United States v. Hamilton, 195 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the government need not prove that a defendant knew a girl was under eighteen years of age in order to sustain a conviction under the Mann Act. The court found that knowledge of the victim's age was not an element of the offense. 196 Similarly, knowledge of the abused child's age should not be considered
an element of the child pornography offense and, hence, unnecessary to be proved by the prosecution. Provision~ that allow the defendant to assert an affirmative defense based on a reasonable bona
fide attempt to ascertain the age of the child should be permitted . 198 Since the harm to the child can be quite severe, the standard of this bona fide attempt should be high, which will assure more
effective laws. 199
C. Enforcement Provisions

To be more effective, the child pornography statutes should include provisions to ease enforcement of the laws. Several provisions included in current child pornography laws will be analyzed

193
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 311.2(b)•.4 (West Supp. 1979) and CAL. LAB. CODE § 1309.5
(West Supp. 1979) ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2923(1)(A) (West Supp. 1978); MICH.
COMP. LAWS§ 750.145c (Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 11-9-1.1 (Supp. 1978); S.C. CODE
§ 16-15-180 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1019(a)(2) (Supp. 1978) (actual or constructive
knowledge); W. VA. CODE§ 61-8A-6 (1977).
194
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT.§§ 13-3501, 13-3508(1978)(defendantisrelievedofliability
if he makes a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the age of the minor); N. Y. PENAL
LA w § 263 .20 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (defendant's good faith belief that actor was older
than 16 may be pleaded as an affirmative defense). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1
(West Supp. 1978) (lack of knowledge of the juvenile's age shall not be a defense).
195
456 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
196
Id. at 173. Cf. United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1941) (dictum); United
States v. Mack, 112 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1940) (dictum) (both recognizing the rule that defendant's knowledge of the age of the woman is not essential element of the crime of statutory
rape).
197
The legislative history of the federal law also reflects this interpretation. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 811, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 61 (' 'The conference substitute accepts the House provision with the intent that it
is not a necessary element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the actual age of the
child"). See also H.R. REP. No. 696, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977).
198
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3501 ,-3508 (West Pamph. Supp. 1978).
199
Therefore, this author would reject the New York defense which allows the defendant
to escape liability if he had a good faith belief that the actor was not under sixteen. N. Y.
PENAL LA w § 263 .20 (McKinney Supp. 1978). "Good faith" does not necessarily require
the defendant to make an affirmative effort to check the age of the actor.
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in terms of their constitutionality and effectiveness in easing enforcement.
1. Record Keeping Provision-One of the major difficulties faced
by law enforcement officials is the near impossibility of discovering
the key producers and large volume distributors of child pornography. In response to this problem, the California statute requires
that both the wholesale distributors and retailers of child pornography maintain records of the names and addresses of persons
from whom such material is obtained. 200 Records are confidential,
except for use by law enforcement officials, and failure to keep
these records is a misdemeanor. 20 1
There is evidence that this record keeping requirement is an effective deterrent to distribution of child pornography. 202 Its effectiveness seems to stem from the fear of the potentiality of law enforcement officials inspecting the records or visiting the premises
of distributors. 203 There is some indication that, regardless of
whether the records are kept, the provision has decreased the
amount of dissemination of child pornography in California. 204
This requirement raises a question whether the state can compel
all retailers and distributors to maintain these records. This requirement arguably compels self- incriminating testimony in viola-

20

° CAL.

LAB. CooE § 1309.5(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1979).
Id. § 1309.5(c).
202
National Decency Reporter, July-August, 1978, at 4, col. 1 (published by Citizens for
Decency Through Law, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio) (statement of State Sen. Newton Russell,
co-author of the California law).
203
"Pornography purveyors do not want to distribute any type of material which gives
law enforcement [officials] the right to inspect their records or visit their premises." Id.
This fear raises a fourth amendment issue regarding reasonable search and seizure. Generally, in order to inspect business records or premises, a warrant must be obtained upon a
showing of probable cause. However, warrantless searches and inspections have been upheld by the Supreme Court in a few circumstances. In upholding a warrantless inspection of
dealers in firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U .S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976), the
Court in United States v. Bi swell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), ruled that warrantless searches, carefully limited in time, place, and scope, were constitutional when a history of pervasive government regulation of the industry existed and the targeted business had accepted a license
in the regulated business. A subsequent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision upheld
the warrantless examination of the required records of a pharmacist under a statute interpreted to be "limited to the business records ... that are properly subject to intenJive regulation in the public interest." United States ex rel. Terraciano v. Montanye, 493 F.2d 682,
685 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974). The statutorily required child pornography
records can be distinguished from both Biswel/ and Terraciano on the grounds that pornography distributors are not licensed by the state. While they are aware of the moderately regulated nature of their business, the pornography dealers have not "consented" to the warrantless search to the same extent as the licensed pharmacists or firearms dealers. Accordingly, it would appear that a warrantless search under the California statute, even if limited
to the required records, would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Of course,
California Jaw enforcement officials remain free to obtain a warrant or subpoena through the
regular judicial process.
20
• According to one of its co-authors, the California Jaw, bolstered by this provision, has
resulted in the destruction of carloads of child pornography in the Los Angeles area. National Decency Reporter, supra note 202, at 4, col. I.
201
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tion of the fifth amendment. In Shapiro v. United States ,205 the
Supreme Court established the required records exception in upholding regulations promulgated pursuant to the wartirrie
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which required that anyone
subject to the Act keep detailed business records for examination
by the Office of Price Administration. 206
Although a variety of rationales have been suggested for the required records exception to the privilege against self-incrimination,
the doctrine is best recognized "as a.limitation on the privilege
based upon the public need for information in limited circumstances to make effective public regulation of certain activities. "207 Therefore, the question becomes a balancing of the
public need for the information against the strong policy in favor of
maintaining the privilege against self-incrimination. Commentators
have suggested that several factors be considered in making this
determination,2° 8 including (1) the burden placed on the party by
the requirements, (2) the importance of the regulation to be effected, and (3) the availability of other means of effectuating the
regulation. In evaluating the Califomia provision on the basis of
these factors, arguably it does not burden the distributors and retailers since gathering of such information would not require ex-

335 U.S. I (1948).
In deciding a trilogy of cases in 1968, the Supreme Court explained the limits of the
required records rule as follows:
First, the purposes of the United States' inquiry must be essentially regulatory;
second, information is to be obtained by requiring the preservation of records of a
kind which the regulated party has customarily kept; and third, the records themselves must have assumed "public aspects'' which render them at least analogous
to public documents.
20

•

20 •

Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968).
207

McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§

208

These factors include:

142, at 303 (2d ed. 1972).

(a) a consideration of the importance of effective regulation of the underlying activity;
(b) the availability of methods other than compulsory self-incrimination as a means
of making this regulation effective;
(c) the burden placed on the party by the requirement, as, for example, whether he
is required to perform extensive activities to collect the information that he would
not otherwise perform, or whether the requirement is simply that he grants access
to information that he would otherwise keep for his own use;
(d) the extent to which the records are simply a convenient method of collecting
essentially public information ... as opposed to requiring that the individual record and submit to public authorities information of a personal nature that would
not otherwise be disclosed;
(e) the extent to which the information revealed would be of value to the government for purposes other than the criminal prosecution of the individual to reveal it;
and
(f) the existence and effectiveness of any limitations upon access of prosecuting
agencies to the information.
Id.
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traordinary activity by either group. Indeed, these records are of
the kind normally kept by businesspeople. Secondly, the regulation
to be effected-the prohibition against producing or selling child
pornography as a means of protecting the welfare of children-is of
very high priority. The third factor, the availability of methods
other than compulsory self-incrimination as a means of making this
regulation effective, raises a more difficult problem. Arguably,
laws aimed directly at retailers and distributors are sufficient
within themselves to prohibit child pornography. In addition, the
law is aimed at only those who sell or distribute child pornography,
activities deemed illegal under the statute. In Haynes, v. United
States ,209 the Court held that a defendant could properly assert the
privilege against self-incrimination under the National Firearms
Act 2 10 which only required registration of certain classes of
firearms, such as sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, and
silencers. The Court found that the "required records" doctrine
was inapplicable, because the registration requirements were directed at a highly selective group presumed to be involved in criminal activities, were concerned with an area permeated with criminal statutes (rather than an essentially noncriminal and regulatory
area of inquiry), and no records or other documents were involved
which had "public aspects. " 211 In light of Haynes, which exempts
persons from keeping records which are inherently incriminating,
the California provision which singles out distributors of child
pornography appears to be unconstitutional. 212
To circumvent the constitutionality problem while achieving one
of the chief goals of record-keeping-facilitating widespread prosecution through better information-the statute could grant limited
immunity to parties maintaining the records. This provision would
preclude the prosecution from using the information contained in
the records against the party who kept them, but would allow the
prosecutor to use such information in initiating and prosecuting
cases against other distributors and retailers. 213 Such a provision
would avoid possible self-incrimination problems, yet provide law
enforcement officials with substantial information from which to
390 U.S. 85 (1968).
26 u.s.c. §§ 5801-5862 (1976).
In United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), an amended version of the National
Firearms Act was upheld. Under this version, all possessors of firearms rather than those
often engaged in unlawful activities were required to comply.
21 2
This same conclusion was reached by another commentator. Note, Free Speech and
Self-Incrimination: The Constitutionality of California's New Child Pornography Laws, 10
PAC. L.J. 119, 136-37 (1979).
213
Such a provision might read: "Any person who maintains records in accordance with
this provision shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise
result by reason of such actions."
20 •
210
211
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locate participants in the child pornography distribution network.214
2. Sanctions-Enforceability of the child pornography laws depends, to some degree, on the sanctions provided for violations.
These are not limited to penal sanctions, but include injunctive relief and seizure of the visual material.
a. Injunctive Procedures-Two state statutes contain procedures
to enjoin a violation or threatened violation of the law. 215 These
provisions allow the sale of a work depicting children engaged in
sexual conduct to be enjoined before the defendant is found guilty.
This provision raises a question as to the extent to which visual
material, a form of speech, may be regulated prior to adjudication
of its illegality. In Freedman v. Maryland, 216 the United States
Supreme Court enumerated the procedural safeguards necessary
for a constitutional scheme of licensirig. The Court held that the
censor must bear the burden of proving that the material is unprotected expression, any restraint prior to judicial review must be
brief, and a final judicial determination must be prompt. 21 7 Under
the child pornography laws, courts would be bound to apply these
same standards. 218
b. Seizure of Material-Two states provide that each photograph, film, videotape, or other reproduction of any child pornographic material shall be contraband and shall be seized and disposed of in accordance with the law. 219 Accepting the view that the
only effective way to end child pornography is to stop the distribution of the material, seizure of the material will prove effective in
deterring distribution of such material. Under the obscenity laws,
however, the material may only be seized following a judicial determination of obscenity. 220 Therefore, under the child pornography laws, the materials may only be seized following conviction
214
A similar grant of immunity is contained in many state child abuse reporting statutes.
See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.625 (Supp. 1978). In order for a state to qualify
for assistance under the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, it must have in
effect a child abuse and neglect law which includes provisions for immunity for persons reporting instances of child abuse and neglect from prosecution under any state law. 42
U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(A)(West 1977).
215 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.014(3)(Hanison Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272,
§ 300 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
216 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
217
Id. at 58-59.
218
The Massachusetts statute provides that procedures for issuance of an injunction
against dissemination of child pornography shall be the same as those applicable under its
obscenity law. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 72, § 30D (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978).
219 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 7-238 (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:81.1 (West Supp.
1978).
220
Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). Materials seized by customs officials must be
submitted within 14 days to a United States District Court for determination of whether they
should be forfeited and destroyed as obscene. House Crime Hearings, supra note 1, at 211
(statement of G.R. Dickerson, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service).
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of the distributor.
c. Penalties-In the vast majority of states, violation of the child
pornography laws is a felony. 221 In general, the length of the sentence and amount of fine vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the twenty-seven states that impose liability on both distributors and producers, 222 twelve states impose equivalent penalties on sellers and producers, 223 while fourteen states impose a
greater penalty on producers than distributors, 224 and one state
imposes a greater penalty on distributors. 225 Several of the states
have provisions for repeat offenders and others provide mandatory
sentences.
As a general proposition, sentences should be long enough to
create a deterrent effect, while not discouraging convictions with
sentences that are perceived to be too harsh. In some states,
lengthy mandatory sentences are imposed that will likely result in a
reluctance to convict. 226 In other states, some of the possible sentences are so harsh that if imposed they arguably constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. 227 Penalties imposed on producers
should be harsher than those imposed on coercers, parents, or distributors. While the latter three classes of defendants are unquestionably involved in activity that results in harm to children, the

221
For the purposes of this analysis, a felony has been arbitrarily defined as a crime with a
sentence of one year or longer.
222
For the purposes of these statistics, the producer group includes producers, coercers,
and parents.
223
These states are Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. For statutory citations see note 60 supra. The federal statute also provides for an equivalent penalty
on both producers and distributors. 18 U .S.C.A., §§ 2251-2252 (West Supp. 1978).
224
These states are Alabama, California, Connecticut, Dela.ware, Florida,Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and South
Dakota. For statutory citations see note 60 supra.
225
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 9, §§ 43.23,.25 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
226 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2922 (West Supp. 1978) (mandatory five year
sentence for producers; mandatory ten year sentence for second offense).
227
See, e.g. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1108-1110 (Supp. 1978) (for producer, first offense
is punishable by 3 to 30 years and second offense rates life imprisonment). Where the duration
ofasentenceimposedononeconvictedofacrimeissodisproportionatetotheoffensecomrnitted
as to shock the conscience and offend fundamental notions of human dignity, the punishment
is prohibited by constitutional provisions proscribing cruel and unusual punishment. Weems
v. United States, 217U .S. 349 (1910). For cases that have applied this principle in the context of
sex offenses against a child, see In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105
Cal. Rptr. 217 (1973)(aggravated penalty of one year to life for second offense of indecent
exposure violated prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); In re WeUs, 46 Cal.
App.3d 592, 121 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1975) (penalty for annoying or molesting children under 18
years of age, a life-maximum sentence for one previously convicted of committing lewd and
lascivious acts on a child under 14 years of age, is invalid); Banks v. State, 342 So.2d 469
(Fla. 1976)(a mandatory penalty of 25 years imprisonment without possibility of parole for
conviction of a sexual battery upon a child of less than age eleven is not a cruel or unusual
punishment and the imposition of a life sentence with 25 years to be served without possibility of parole upon a defendant convicted of a sexual battery upon an eight year old boy was
valid).
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producer is directly involved in child abuse, activity warranting a
more severe penalty.
D. Protection of the Victimized Child

Most of the state statutes ignore the problems of the victimized
child, concentrating solely on imposing liability on the primary actors in the industry. However, one state has an express provision
whereby an official may take temporary custody of the child victim. 228 In at least one state private reports of child abuse and the
official investigative report, including reported violations of the
child pornography law, must be sent to the prosecuting attorney of
the county in which the child lives. 229 Creative provisions such as
these are essential to an effective child pornography regulatory
strategy. 230
The current child pornography statutes fail to provide for rehabilitation of the child. Given the serious emotional, psychological, and physical harm suffered by the victims of child pornography, legislatures should consider incorporating treatment for
these victims into present child abuse rehabilitation programs. On
the federal level, funds are available for rehabilitative purposes
under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. 231
V. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the preceding analysis, this article has raised several
issues and made legislative recommendations. In drafting an effective child pornography statute, two key factors, the comprehensiveness of coverage and the obscenity requirement, are of
paramount importance.
An effective child pornography statute must impose liability on
all the actors in the industry. As was previously discussed, regula228
1977 Conn. Pub. Act No. 577, § 3, reprinted in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. app., at 170
(West Unclassified Acts Pamph. Supp. 1978).
229 Act of June 20, 1978, Pub. Act No. 252, 1978 Mich. Legis. Seiv. 759 (West) (to be
codified as MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 722 .622, .623, .628, .633).
230 The Maine statute contains a declaration of legislative policy recognizing that publicity
may often be harmful to the victims. District attorneys, their assistants and employees and
other law enforcement officials are to refrain from any unnecessary pretrial public disclosure
of information that may identify a minor victim of an offense under the child pornography
laws, sex offenses, or incest laws. Minors-Sexual Exploitation, ch. 628, 1978 Me. Legis.
Seiv. 154 (West) (to be codified as ME. REv. STAT. tit. 30, § 508). But see Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); State ex rel. Daily Mail Pub. Co. v. Smith, 248
S.E. 2d 269 (W. Va.), cert granted, 99 S.Ct 448 (1978)(statute unconstitutional to the extent
that it made it a criminal offense for a newspaper to publish the name of the child in any
proceeding under child welfare statutes without prior approval of the trial court). Cf. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
231
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (Supp. V. 1975).
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tion of the distributor may be as important, if not more important,
than regulation of the producer of the material. 232 In addition, liability should be imposed on coercers and parents. A producer may
be defined as any person who employs or uses a child to engage in,
or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any material depicting such conduct. 233 A coercer may be defined as any person
who persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any child to engage in,
or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any material depicting such conduct. 234 The parent/guardian class should include
any parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or control of a
child who knowingly permits such child to engage in, or to assist
any other person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing any material depicting such conduct. 235 A
distributor may be defined as any person who knowingly sells, delivers, exhibits or otherwise makes available, or offers or agrees to
sell, deliver, exhibit, or otherwise makes available material depicting a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct, or buys, procures,
or possesses such material with intent to disseminate it. 236
The other major recommendation for drafting effective legislation is to eliminate any requirement that the visual material be legally obscene. An obscenity requirement poses a
large barrier to enforcement of child pornography laws. Proving
the obscenity of visual material is a costly procedure for prosecutors.237 Further, the harm to the child actor is not necessarily
connected to the legal status of the material. 238 This article has argued that failure to provide an obscenity requirement does not violate the first amendment, provided that explicit sexual conduct is
defined to only include conduct certain to harm the child victim. 239
It must be noted, however, that present laws, which use broad definitions of sexually explicit conduct, may be constitutionally
overbroad. 240 These laws must be amended to include only sexual
conduct that harms the child. 241 Although the difficult question
whether an obscenity requirement is a necessary prerequisite to
232

See notes 120-22 & 127 and accompanying text supra.
This definition is similar to the one contained in the federal statute, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 225l(a) (West Supp. 1978).
234
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 225l(a) (West Supp. 1978).
235
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(b) (West Supp. 1978).
236
This definition is similar to the one contained in the Illinois statute, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38. § l 1-20a(b) (Smith-Hurd Pamph. Supp. 1978).
237
See notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
238
See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
239
See notes 76-134 and accompanying text supra.
240
See notes 128-34 and accompanying text supra.
241
See notes 160-70 and accompanying text supra.
233
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distributor liability has not been decided by a higher court, this article has argued that such a requirement is unnecessary. 242
In addition to these two major recommendations, several other
provisions are suggested, many of which are contained in some
existing statutes. The definition of visual material should include
undeveloped or unprocessed materials. 243 Additionally, live performances depicting a child engaged in explicit sexual conduct
should be covered in the law. 244 Such provisions are constitutional
and would significantly expand the scope of the law.
To minimize the prosecutorial problem of proving that the actor
was a minor, statutes should include a provision allowing the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the age of the child. 245
Since the primary statutory purpose is to prevent harm to the child
actors, and not the viewers, the jury should not be allowed to make
a judgment regarding the age of the child based solely on the visual
material. Only testimony of an expert, familiar with the various
problems of judging age based on photographic appearances,
should be admissible on this point. 246 An effective constitutional
child pornography statute need not require the material be produced or distributed for commercial purposes. 247
Any knowledge requirement should distinguish between knowledge of content of the materials and knowledge of the child actor's
age. Parents should be held to a subjective standard of knowledge
of the general character of the material, while the distributor and
coercer should be held to an objective standard. 248 On the other
hand, knowledge of the age of the child should not be an element of
the offense. 249 The statute, however, should provide for an affirmative defense which allows the defendant to escape liability upon
making a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the age of the
actor. 250 In light of the harms being protected against, the standard
by which the bona fide attempt is judged should be high, so defendants may only escape liability in cases where they had been
clearly misled by the child actor. 251
The record-keeping provision of the California statute 252 may be
effective in reaching the economic center of the industry - the dis242

See notes 101-34 and accompanying text supra.
For citations to examples of such a provision, see note 70 supra.
244 Id.
245
For citations to examples of such a provision, see note 156 supra.
246
See text accompanying note 159 supra.
247
See notes 171-73 and accompanying text supra.
248
See notes 177-92 and accompanying text supra.
249
See notes 193-97 and accompanying text supra.
250
See note 198 and accompanying text supra.
251
See note 199 supra.
252 CAL. LAB. CooE § 1309.5 (West Supp. 1979).
243
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tribution network. 253 To avoid fifth amendment violations, the
state should require wholesalers and retailers to maintain records
of the names and addresses of persons from whom such material is
obtained, but preclude prosecutors from using such information
against the party who kept them. 254 Under this proposal, law enforcement officials could get access to information crucial to destruction of the child pornography distribution network.
Procedures for enjoining distribution and seizing illegal visual
material should be provided for in the statutes. 255 Such provisions
will prevent further distribution of child pornography. Constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards, however, must be
adhered to in utilizing these provisions. 256
Penalties should be harsh enough to create a deterrent effect,
while not discouraging convictions with sentences that are too severe. 257 While the precise lengths of sentences and fines are best
left to the discretion of the legislature, this article recommends that
the penalties imposed on producers be harsher than those imposed
on coercers, parents, or distributors.
Finally, the statute should contain provisions to protect and treat
the victimized child. This can be best achieved through coordinated efforts of state child abuse authorities and prosecutors of
child pornography laws. The child may gain access to state child
abuse treatment programs if the prosecutor is required to transmit
the names of the child pornography victims to the child abuse authorities. Likewise, a tighter system of enforcement may be
achieved if the child abuse authorities are required to report suspected violations of the child pornography law to local prosecutors.258 Rather than create a separate agency to deal with
treatment of the victimized child, treatment should fall under the
auspices of the established state child abuse agency.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The production and distribution of visual material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct is best viewed as a particular type
of child abuse. Because of the harm to the child and the limited
coverage of existing laws, new statutes were necessary to deal with
the problem. To date, the legislative approaches to the child por253

See notes 202-04 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 213-14 and accompanying text supra.
255
For citations to such provisions, see notes 215 and 219 supra.
256
See note 216-18 and 220 and accompanying text supra.
257 See notes 221-27 and accompanying text supra.
258
See, e.g., Act of June 20, 1978, Pub. Act. No. 252, 1978 Mich. Legis. Serv. 759 (West)
(to be codified as MICH. CoMP. LAWS§§ 722.622, .623, .628, .633).
254
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nography problem have varied greatly. The key issue presented by
these statutes, whether the material must be obscene in regulating
distributors, has only been dealt with by a few courts. The ultimate
effectiveness of the child pornography statutes will depend on the
determination of the balance that must be drawn between the
state's interest in protecting its children and first amendment freedoms. In addition to imposing criminal liability on all actors in the
industry-producers, coercers, parents and distributors-the effectiveness of the laws can be further enhanced through a reporting
requirement on distributors, reasonable penalties, and certain
evidentiary provisions. Moreover, the victim of the child pornography industry-the child- can be afforded better protection and
necessary treatment by coordination of child abuse reporting statutes and child pornography statutes.
Given more effective legislation, the burden rests on law enforcement officials to aggressively enforce the statutes. Only then
will the outrageous abuse of children inherent in the production of
this material begin to be curbed.
-

T. Christopher Donnelly

